|
|
|
Document:
Settler v. Lameer
ALVIN SETTLER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. WILSON LAMEER, Chief of Police, and O.
N. OLNEY, Chief Judge, Yakima Tribal Court, Respondents-Appellees. ALVIN
SETTLER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. WILSON LAMEER, Chief of Police, and WILLIAM
YALLUP, Chief Judge, Yakima Tribal Court, Respondents-Appellees. MARY SETTLER,
Petitioner-Appellee, v. WILSON LAMEER, Chief of Police, and WILLIAM YALLUP,
Chief Judge, Yakima Tribal Court, Respondents-Appellants
Nos. 71-2364, 74-1627, 74-1656
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
507 F.2d 231;
1974 U.S. App. LEXIS 5896
November 26, 1974
PRIOR HISTORY:
[**1]
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Washington.
JUDGES: Trask and Sneed, Circuit Judges, and Jameson, * District Judge.
* Honorable W. J. Jameson, United States Senior District Judge for the
District of Montana, sitting by designation.
OPINIONBY: JAMESON
OPINION:
[*232] JAMESON, District Judge:
Three actions involving the validity of
fishing
regulations promulgated by the Trial Council of the Yakima Indian Nation are joined in
this appeal. In causes Nos. 71-2364 and 74-1627 Alvin Settler appeals the
denial of his petitions for habeas corpus following separate convictions for
violations of
tribal
fishing
regulations in 1967 and 1968. In cause No. 74-1656, which arises out of the same incident
as cause No. 74-1627, the Chief of Police and Chief Judge of the Yakima
Tribal Court appeal from a decision of the district court granting the petition of
Mary Settler for a writ of habeas corpus following her conviction in
Tribal Court for
fishing violations.
I. BACKGROUND
The Yakima
Reservation was established by the
Treaty with the Yakimas, June 9, 1955. Article III of the
Treaty states in pertinent part:
"The exclusive right of taking
[**2]
fish in all the streams, where running through or bordering said
reservation, is further secured to said confederated
tribes and
bands of Indians, as also the right of taking
fish at all usual and
accustomed places, in common with citizens of the
Territory, and of erecting temporary buildings for curing them; . . . 12 Stat. 951, 953.
In 1966, the Yakima
Tribal Council n1 enacted
regulations deemed necessary to promote the
conservation of the
fishing resources which were reserved in the
Treaty of 1855. Resolution T-90-66 among other things established
fishing seasons, prohibited
fishing in certain areas,
[*233] allocated
fishing
sites, established a
tribal identification system, and specified the methods of
fishing that were permissible and the type of boats and gear that could be used. In
addition it provided methods of enforcement and penalties. Although purporting
to regulate
fishing activities of
tribal members outside of the
reservation, the resolution provided for
arrest,
seizure of equipment and punishment
only within the
boundaries of the
reservation.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n1 The Yakima Indian Nation is not a
tribe organized under the Wheeler-Howard Indian Reorganization Act, 48 Stat. 984,
25 U.S.C. § 476, but exists by reason of the
Treaty of 1855.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
[**3]
Resolution T-90-66 was amended in 1968 by T-48-68. That resolution provided for
off-reservation enforcement of
tribal
fishing
regulations in the following language:
"Any
Tribal
Game Warden or any
Tribal Law Enforcement Officer shall be
authorized to enforce the provisions of this and any other
regulation of the Yakima
Tribe governing the exercise of
Treaty
fishing rights whether on or off the Yakima
Reservation and where violations are committed in his presence, he shall
arrest the offender, take him into custody, and
seize all
fishing gear, boats or motors used by said offender." (emphasis added).
The enforcement of these resolutions n2 with respect to
off-reservation
tribal
fishing is the basis of the three actions.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n2 The Bureau of Indian Affairs, acting pursuant to 25 CFR 11.1(e), approved
Resolution T-90-66 by a letter on April 18, 1966 (revised by letter of May 10,
1966) from the Acting Commissioner to the
Tribal Council. The Bureau approved Resolution T-48-68 in letters from the acting
Commissioner and the Commissioner dated April 17 and May 17, 1968.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
[**4]
A.
Cause No. 71-2364
Alvin Settler, an enrolled member of the Confederated
Tribes and
Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, n3 was
convicted on September 29, 1967 by the Yakima
Tribal Court of twice violating
Tribal Resolution
T-90-66 n4 and for disobeying the lawful orders of the
Tribal Court. n5 It is conceded that on both occasions, Settler was
fishing at
"usual and
accustomed
fishing
sites" off the
reservation. Although given citations at the
site of the violations, Settler was not
arrested until he was found within the exterior boundaries of the
reservation.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n3 Neither Mary nor Alvin Settler resided on the Yakima
Reservation.
n4 Settler was charged with two separate offenses, committed on July 14, 1967
and August 8, 1967, of
fishing for salmon with a gillnet in the Columbia River during the closed season, in
violation of Resolution T-90-66 and sub-resolution T-100-67. For the first
offense he was
fined $80.00 plus $2.50 court costs and given a thirty day suspension from any
fishing activities; and for the second offense was
fined $120.00 plus $2.50 court costs and given a ninety day suspension.
At his trial Settler refused to take part in the proceedings. The
Tribal Court, in accordance with the Law and Order Code of the Yakima Indian Nation,
would not permit him to be represented by professional counsel.
[**5]
n5 On this charge the sentence was a fine of $50.00 and $2.50 court costs or 30
days in jail.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
In the habeas corpus proceedings instituted by Settler following his
conviction, the district court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction.
This court reversed and remanded for a hearing on the merits.
Settler v. Yakima Tribal Court, 419 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1969). n6
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n6 Following remand Wilson Lameer, Chief of Police, and O. N. Olney, Chief
Judge of the Yakima Nation
Tribal
Court were added as respondents.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
On remand, the district court held:
(1)
"The
regulation of the right to
fish in the 'usual and
accustomed places' off of the
reservation granted by the
Treaty is an internal affair of the Yakima Indian
Tribe . . . Such
tribal
fishing
regulations are binding upon
tribal members and are enforceable in the Yakima Indian
Tribal Court."
(2) The state has certain limited rights to regulate
off-reservation
fishing by Indians,
[**6] but
"such
regulation must be necessary for the
conservation of the
fishery resources".
(3)
"Any right the state may have to impose restrictions on
off-reservation
fishing activities does not preclude the Yakima Indian
Tribe from placing restrictions on its own members to control their
fishing activities [off
reservation]
[*234] where state
regulations are inapplicable, unenforceable, or nonexistent."
B.
Causes Nos. 74-1627 and 74-1656
Mary Settler, also a member of the Yakima
Indian Nation, was
convicted by the Yakima
Tribal Court on August 21, 1968 for a violation of
Tribal Resolution T-90-66, as amended, and for resisting lawful
arrest and attempting escape. n7
Tribal officers, acting pursuant to
Tribal Resolution T-48-68,
arrested Mary at a
"usual and
accustomed"
fishing
site approximately 56 miles
outside the
confines of the Yakima
Reservation. At the time of Mary's
arrest by
Tribal
Fish and
Game Wardens, her
fishing gear was seized and is being held pending the final outcome of this action.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n7 At the time of the
fishing violation, the Columbia River and its tributaries had been closed by Emergency
Order No. 773 of the Director of
Fisheries of the State of Washington as well as by
Tribal Resolution T-56-68, an emergency measure passed to protect the
fishery. For the
fishing violation Mary
Settler was
fined $225.00 and her
treaty
fishing activities were suspended for 90 days. For resisting
arrest and attempted escape she was given fines totalling $100.00 and $2.50 court
costs or a total of 30 days in jail.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
[**7]
As a result of the same incident, Alvin Settler was
convicted of a violation of T-90-66, as amended, for knowingly allowing his
fishing crew to
fish during the Yakima
Tribe's closed season and to use illegal
fishing gear registered in his name. n8 Unlike Mary, Alvin was
arrested
within the external boundaries of the
reservation.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n8 On these charges Alvin was
fined a total of $450.00 and $2.50 court costs.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed by both Mary and Alvin were denied
for lack of jurisdiction. On appeal, this court reversed (Settler v. Lameer, 419 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1969) and remanded for proceedings on the merits.
On remand, the district court, ruling on cross motions for summary judgment in
the case of Mary Settler, held that:
(1) the
arrest of Mary Settler some 56 miles outside of the
Reservation was unauthorized and unlawful. The
enforcement of
Tribal
fishing
regulations
"is limited to
arrest and
seizure on the
reservation, . . . even though the
Tribe has the authority to govern
[**8] the exercise of the Indian's right to take
fish at the 'usual and
accustomed places' located off of the
reservation".
(2)
". . . because the
Tribal authorities lacked jurisdiction to enforce
Tribal
Regulations off the
reservation, the
seizure of petitioner's personal property incident to petitioner's
arrest was unlawful".
The court denied Alvin Settler's petition, noting that the issues were the same
as those in No. 71-2364,
supra.
Issues on Appeal
The two primary issues presented on appeal are:
(1) Whether the Yakima Indian Nation may enforce its
fishing
regulations with respect to violations committed by
Tribal members outside the
reservation by arresting and trying violators upon their return to the
reservation;
(2) Whether and under what circumstances the Yakima Indian Nation may enforce
tribal
fishing
regulations by physically arresting violators and seizing their
fishing gear at the usual and
accustomed
fishing places off the Yakima
Reservation.
A third issue is raised by Alvin Settler with respect to his conviction by the
Trial Court in 1967. Settler contends that his
constitutional rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments were violated in that he was
[**9] tried twice for the same offense and was denied the assistance of professional
counsel.
II. APPLICATION OF
FISHING
REGULATIONS TO OFF
RESERVATION
FISHING
Mary and Alvin Settler and the State of Washington n9 contend that the Yakima
[*235] Indian Nation may not
regulate
off-reservation
Tribal
fishing activities because (a) in the Yakima
Treaty of 1855, the Confederated
Tribes of the Yakima Nation did not reserve the right to exercise criminal
jurisdiction beyond the territorial
confines of the
reservation; (b) Congress has not subsequently authorized the Yakima Nation to exercise
criminal jurisdiction beyond the territorial
confines of the
reservation; and (c) any
Tribal exercise of criminal jurisdiction outside of the
reservation would be in derogation of the
sovereignty of the State of Washington.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n9 The State of Washington filed a brief amicus curiae in 71-2364 in support of
its position that the
"state possesses the sole and exclusive
authority to regulate
fishing activities in
off-reservation waters". The United States filed amicus curiae briefs in 71-2364 and 74-1656 in
support of the position of the Chief of Police and Chief Judge of the Yakima
Tribal Court.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End
Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
[**10]
(a)
The
Treaty with the Yakimas, June 9, 1855.
As part of a government policy to extinguish Indian title to property in the
Western United States (Appropriation Act of March 3, 1853, 10 Stat. 226, 238),
Isaac Stevens, the first Governor of the
Territory of Washington was appointed in 1854 to negotiate
treaties with all of the Indian
tribes in the Washington
Territory. n10
"Governor Stevens was directed that in making the
treaties, he should endeavor to unite the 'numerous
bands and fragments of
tribes into
tribes . . .'"
United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. 1974). Pursuant to these directives, Governor Stevens negotiated a
treaty with fourteen
tribes and
bands of Indians living in Western Washington who by the terms of the
Treaty comprise the Yakima Nation. 12 Stat. 951. By that
Treaty, the confederated
tribes composing the Yakima Nation
"gave
up their claim by Indian title to a large expanse of
territory over which they roamed in return for the United States' recognition of a
portion of the area claimed under Indian title as a
reservation for the Yakima Nation . . .".
Whitefoot v. United States, 155 Ct. Cl. 127, 293 F.2d 658, 659 (1961), cert. denied
369
[**11] U.S. 818, 7 L. Ed. 2d 784, 82 S. Ct. 829 (1962).
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n10 Under Section 2 of the act creating the Washington
Territory, Act of March 2, 1953, 10 Stat. 172, 173, the Governor of the
Territory was also to serve as Superintendent of Indian Affairs in the
Territory.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
One of the most important provisions of that
Treaty from the standpoint of the
tribes and
bands of Indians was that preserving the Indians' right to take
fish at
"all usual and
accustomed places". As the Supreme Court noted in
Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 684, 86 L. Ed. 1115, 62 S. Ct. 862 (1942),
"From the report . . . of the proceedings in the long council at which the
treaty agreement was reached, we are impressed by the strong desire the Indians had
to retain the right to hunt and
fish in accordance with the immemorial customs of their
tribes". The right to
fish was of
vital import to the Indians; it was
"not much less necessary to the existence of the Indians than the atmosphere
they breathed".
United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381, 49 L.
[**12] Ed. 1089, 25 S. Ct. 662 (1905). In
Whitefoot, supra, at 659, Mr. Justice Reed (retired) noted:
"Then (when the
Treaty was made), as now,
fishing . . . was important to the Indians and provided them their food, fresh and
dried, and a medium for acquiring other commodities". n11
In addition,
fish also were important in
Tribal religious ceremonies.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n11 The importance of
fish in the diet of the Indians was set forth in the Findings of Fact in
United States v. Washington, supra:
"In the main, at the time of the
treaty, the Indians who were parties to the Yakima
Treaty lived in a food gathering culture. They existed on
game,
fish, roots, berries and some cultivated vegetables. Of these foods
fish was a major food and they landed salmon, steelhead, trout, mussels, eel, and other
miscellaneous
fish. Salmon, however, both fresh and cured, was a staple in the food supply of
these Indians. It was annually consumed by these Indians in the neighborhood of
500 pounds per capita." (emphasis added). Findings of Fact No. 151.
While the extent of subsistence
fishing has decreased since 1855, the Findings of Fact state further:
"The Yakima Indians have been and
continue to be very dependent on anadromous
fish to sustain their way of life. They live close to the poverty level and have
not reached economic or social parity with non-Indian citizens of the State of
Washington. Anadromous
fish are
vital to the Indians' diet with approximately 2,000 of the enrolled members
fishing for personal consumption." Findings of Fact No. 163.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
[**13]
[*236] (b)
Extent of
Treaty
Fishing Rights.
The Settlers and the State of Washington do not question the existence of
Tribal
fishing rights or the right of the Yakima Nation to regulate
fishing activities within the
reservation boundaries. The Settlers expressly recognize also that the
Tribal Council may
"enact
regulations concerning the
fishing by
tribal members at the usual and
accustomed off
reservation
treaty
sites". They contend, however, that the
Treaty constituted a relinquishment of all
Tribal jurisdiction beyond the
confines of the
reservation; that Congress has never subsequently authorized the Yakima Nation to exert
such jurisdiction; and that the
State of Washington has exclusive
enforcement powers off the
reservation. The State of Washington claims
"sole and exclusive
authority to regulate
fishing activities in
off-reservation waters".
In interpreting the language of
treaties with the Indians, the court must consider
"how the words of the
treaty were understood by the unlettered people, rather than their critical meaning".
Worcester v. Georgia 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 582, 8 L. Ed. 483 (1832);
Winans, supra at 380-381. n12 Moreover, in interpreting
[**14] Indian
treaties the Supreme Court has consistently followed the general rule that
"Doubtful expressions are to be resolved in favor of the weak and defenseless
people who are the wards of the nation, dependent upon its protection and good
faith".
Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367, 74 L. Ed. 478, 50 S. Ct. 121 (1930). n13
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n12 The difficulty of explaining the
Treaty provisions to the Yakima Indians was expressed in the Findings of Fact in
United States v. Washington, supra:
"Since, however, the vast majority of Indians at the
treaty councils did not speak or understand English, the
treaty provisions and the remarks of the
treaty commissioners were interpreted . . . to the Indians in the Chinook jargon and
then translated into native languages by Indian interpreters. Chinook jargon, a
trade medium of limited vocabulary and simple grammar, was inadequate to
express precisely the legal effects of the
treaties, although the general meaning of
treaty language could be explained." Findings of Fact No. 22.
n13 This rule was most recently quoted with approval in
McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164, 174, 36 L. Ed. 2d 129, 93 S. Ct. 1257 (1973).
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
[**15]
The
Treaty expressly reserved to the
confederated
tribes and
bands of Indians
"the right of taking
fish at all usual and
accustomed places, in common with citizens of the
Territory". It would be unreasonable to conclude that in reserving these
vital rights, the Indians intended to divest themselves of all control over the
exercise of those rights. n14 Prior to the
Treaty the
regulations for
fishing had been established by the
Tribe through its customs and tradition. The Indians must surely have understood
that
Tribal control would continue after the
Treaty. n15
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n14 The difficulties of ascertaining
"the subjective mental processes" of the Indians in interpreting Article III of the
Treaty are well summarized in Whitefoot v. United States,
supra, at 667, n. 15:
"The
treaty was dictated by white conquerors of a subjugated race. It is inconceivable
that there was the kind of arms-length bargaining as to terms which would have
made relevant as ascertainment of the Indian intention (sic). Naturally the
Indians wanted the unattainable -- to be left alone. It is
doubtful that the untrained Indian mind understood the ambiguities of Article
III even though the white representatives went to some pains to explain the
provision. A great and unbridgeable void existed between the language and
culture of the two races. When one considers that the meaning of Article III
was sufficiently in doubt as to require the interpretative services of the
Supreme Court and several lesser courts in subsequent years, one can readily
forgive the Indians for any lack of perspicacity or, indeed clairvoyance."
[**16]
n15 As indicative of
tribal intent in this regard, it is important to note that in fact
tribal custom and tradition did continue to
"regulate" the nature of
tribal
fishing for many years after the
Treaty. Whitefoot v. United States,
supra at 667, n. 15, 668-669.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
[*237] In addition, the
Treaty of 1855 does not expressly state that the Yakima Nation relinquished its
jurisdiction over matters pertaining to
fishing rights. As the
treaty constitutes a grant of rights
from the Indians to the Government,
Winans, supra at 381, any rights not granted must be considered retained by the
Tribe. Here, the Indians qualified their
fishing right
only to the extent of permitting citizens of the
territory to
fish
"in common
" with them at
"usual and
accustomed
fishing places" off the
reservation. Given this fact and the
vital role of
fishing in the Yakima culture, we conclude that the Yakima Nation did reserve the
authority to regulate
Tribal
fishing at
"all usual and
accustomed places", whether on or off the
reservation.
This conclusion is supported by the nature of the
fishing rights.
[**17] As set forth in
Whitefoot, supra, at 663, the
fishing rights reserved in the
Treaty of 1855 are communal rights of the
Tribe, even though the individual members benefit from those rights. The
determination of when and how the rights may be exercised is an
"internal affair" of the
Tribe. As the district court
correctly pointed out,
"one of the last remnants of
sovereignty retained by the Yakima Indian
Tribe is the power to regulate their internal and social relations". This was recognized in
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 221-222, 3 L. Ed. 2d 251, 79 S. Ct. 269 (1959) with reference to the
Treaty with the Navajo
Tribe:
"implicit in these
treaty terms, as it was in the
treaties with the Cherokees involved in Worcester v. Georgia, was the understanding
that the internal affairs of the Indians remained exclusively within the
jurisdiction of whatever
tribal government existed."
The mere fact that the
fishing may take place off the
reservation does not make the
regulation of
treaty
fishing any less an internal matter. The locus of the act is not conclusive.
Littell v. Nakai, 344 F.2d 486, 490 (9 Cir. 1965). The
Tribe has the
authority to regulate the exercise of the
[**18]
fishing rights it retained at
"all usual and
accustomed places", even those off the
reservation.
This does not mean that the State of Washington is without any
authority to regulate
off-reservation
fishing. That power has been expressly recognized, but it has been strictly limited.
In
Tulee v. Washington, supra, the Court held that the State of Washington could not require Indians
fishing under the
Treaty of 1855 to obtain a license for
fishing at
"usual and
accustomed places" off the
reservation. The Court further stated that any
regulations which are imposed by the state on
off-reservation
fishing by Yakima Indians must be reasonable and
"necessary to the
conservation of
fish".
Id. at 684. This position was recently reaffirmed in
Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game, 391 U.S. 392, 398, 20 L. Ed. 2d 689, 88 S. Ct. 1725 (1968) wherein the Court, in construing a
treaty
fishing
provision identical to that here, stated:
"The right to
fish 'at all usual and
accustomed' places may, of course, not be qualified by the State, even though all Indians
born in the United States are now citizens of the United States. . . . But the
manner of
fishing, the size of the take, the
[**19] restriction of commercial
fishing, and the like may be regulated by the State
in the interest of
conservation, provided the
regulation meets appropriate standards and does not discriminate against the Indians." (emphasis added).
We agree with the district court in cause No. 71-2364 that
"once the limits of state authority have been reached there remain significant
areas of
fishing activities which are not necessarily subject to state
regulation. Among the
fishing activities particularly susceptible to
regulation by the
Tribe are: (1) the use of
accustomed
fishing places; (2) the allocation of
fishing time among individual members of the
Tribe; (3) the type of gear; (4) the
time of taking
fish; (5) the determination of preference among
fishing purposes, i.e. subsistence, commercial, or ceremonial."
[*238] We conclude that the
regulation of these activities with respect to
off-reservation
fishing is within the scope of the rights retained by the Yakima Nation in the
Treaty of 1855. n16 Appellees had the authority to
arrest and prosecute
tribal members for violation of the
Tribal
fishing
regulations. The district court correctly held in 71-2364 and 74-1627 that an
[**20]
arrest on the
reservation for violation of
fishing
regulations off the
reservation is valid.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n16 The argument that to permit
tribal jurisdiction beyond the boundaries of the
reservation is a violation of the
sovereignty of the State of Washington is without merit. The varibus Indian
treaties constitute the Supreme Law of the Land. Upon entering the union, the State of
Washington and all other states were bound by those
treaties. U.S. Const. Art. VI.
See also,
Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 64 L. Ed. 641, 40 S. Ct. 382 (1920).
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
III.
OFF-RESERVATION
ARREST AND
SEIZURE
We turn now to the question presented in the Mary Settler case, No. 74-1656:
whether the Yakima Nation has the right under its
Tribal Resolution T-48-68 to enforce
tribal
fishing
regulations by
arrest and
seizure at
"usual and
accustomed"
fishing places
off the
reservation.
The district court concluded that,
"The incidents of
sovereignty retained by the Indian
tribes on the
reservation do not include the authority to make an
arrest
[**21] outside of the territorial limits and
confines of the
Reservation to enforce an Indian
Tribal
regulation". In support of its position, the court cited
Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148-149, 36 L. Ed. 2d 114, 93 S. Ct. 1267 (1973);
Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game, supra at 398, 399-400;
Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 67-69, 71-73, 75-76, 7 L. Ed. 2d 573, 82 S. Ct. 562 (1962);
Tulee v. Washington, supra at 684;
Shaw v. Gibson-Zahnisor Oil Corp., 276 U.S. 575, 579-580, 72 L. Ed. 709, 48 S. Ct. 333 (1928);
Kennedy v. Becker, 241 U.S. 556, 562-564, 60 L. Ed. 1166, 36 S. Ct. 705 (1916);
United States v. Winans, supra at 384; and
Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504, 510-511, 513-515, 41 L. Ed. 244, 16 S. Ct. 1076 (1896).
None of those cases, however, involve the precise issue before this court, i.e.
whether
tribal enforcement powers extend to
"usual and
accustomed"
fishing places beyond the
confines of the
reservation. Rather, they consider the question of
state
regulation of
off-reservation activities. The only case we have found which discusses the question of
off-reservation
regulation by a
tribe is
United States v. Washington, supra
[**22] . There the court held that,
"The Yakima Nation and the Quinalt
Tribe are presently qualified to self-regulate the
off-reservation
fishing of their
tribal members". n17 The court, however, did not deal specifically with the question of
off-reservation
arrest and
seizures by
tribal law enforcement officers.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n17 The court said further:
"The uncontradicted evidence shows that for a considerable time the Quinault and
Yakima
tribes have adopted and effectively enforced
tribal
fishing
regulations which in some material respects are more restrictive than the
regulations of
Fisheries and
Game. To a considerable extent those
tribes have consulted and cooperated with
Fisheries and
Game in matters pertaining to responsible
regulation of Indian
fishing."
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
In resolving this issue, we must again look to the intention of the Indians at
the time of the
Treaty. Having determined that the Yakima Nation by the
Treaty of 1855 intended to retain not only their ancient
fishing rights but also the power to regulate the exercise
[**23] of those rights regardless of location, it would be inconsistent to narrowly
limit the
enforcement of those rights to
arrest and
seizure on the
reservation. The power to regulate is only meaningful when combined with the power to
enforce.
The district court has suggested two alternative methods of enforcing the
tribal
regulations: (1) withholding
"the rights or benefits of the protection of
[*239]
Treaty created immunities"; and (2)
"wait until a transgressor has returned to the
reservation and then make an
arrest and
confine that person or cause him to be present in court". Either method at best affords
only a partial solution to the enforcement problem. For either to be
effective, it would be necessary for the Yakima Nation to have its
game wardens or other enforcement officers patrol
"usual and
accustomed"
fishing places off the
reservation and check licenses,
fishing gear, and the quantity and nature of a catch in order to establish violations for
which the
Tribe may impose criminal penalties.
The second suggested method would of course be available only in the event the
violators came voluntarily to the
reservation. Many members of the
Tribe, including the Settlers,
[**24] do not reside on the
reservation and could easily avoid
arrest by staying away from the
reservation. Sanctions imposed upon non-reservation members by withholding
fishing privileges would also be difficult to enforce in the absence of the power to
arrest.
The regulatory authority retained by the Yakima Nation with respect to the
exercise of its
off-reservation
fishing rights can be truly
effective only through
off-reservation enforcement powers at the
"usual and
accustomed"
fishing places. n18 In
United States v. Winans, supra at 381, the Supreme Court characterized the
fishing rights secured by the
Treaty of 1855 as constituting
"a servitude upon every piece of land as though described therein".
Tribal jurisdiction extends to such land for the limited purpose of preserving
tribal
fishing rights connected therewith.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n18 In view of the strict limitation on the power of the state to regulate
Indian
off-reservation
fishing, there would be no
effective
regulation and enforcement of a broad range of
fishing activities if enforcement powers are denied to the
Tribe.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
[**25]
Throughout their briefs, the Settlers and the State of Washington contend that
any recognition of
tribal jurisdiction outside the
confines of the
reservation violates the
sovereignty of the State of Washington. In support of this argument reliance is placed on
the
"equal footing"
doctrine enunciated in
Ward v. Race Horse, supra. In
Race Horse, the Court held that the Enabling Act admitting Wyoming to the Union, 26 Stat.
222 (1890) invalidated certain
off-reservation hunting provisions in the Bannock Indian
Treaty of 1869. According to the Court, to hold these hunting provisions of the
treaty viable would be to deny Wyoming
"equal footing" with the other states.
The strict construction and application of the
"equal footing" doctrine in
Race Horse has been modified by implication.
See,
Johnson v. Gearlds, 234 U.S. 422, 438-440, 58 L. Ed. 1383, 34 S. Ct. 794 (1914);
Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 259-264, 57 L. Ed. 820, 33 S. Ct. 449 (1913); and
United States v. Winans, supra at 381-384. n19 Every state entering the Union is admitted subject to all
treaties currently in effect. In the event of a conflict between state law and a prior
treaty, the prior
[**26]
treaty must take precedence. Only Congress may modify or abrogate a
treaty.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n19 The contention of the Settlers and the State of Washington that
Mescalero v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 36 L. Ed. 2d 114, 93 S. Ct. 1267 (1973)
"emphatically reaffirmed" the strict construction of the
"equal footing" doctrine in
Race Horse is untenable. The only reference to
Race Horse was dictum and merely cited the case for the proposition that
"Indians going beyond
reservation boundaries have generally been held subject to non-discriminatory state law
otherwise applicable to all citizens of the State".
Mescalero, supra at 148-149.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
We conclude that
by the
Treaty of 1855 the Yakima Indian Nation retained regulatory and enforcement powers
with respect to
tribal
fishing at all
"usual and
accustomed places" off the
reservation. No act of Congress, including the Washington Enabling Act, 25 Stat. 676
(1889), has qualified these reserved powers. The powers therefore continue to
exist.
[*240] In so holding, we are not blind
[**27] to the potential for both regulatory and enforcement problems. Any problems
which may arise, however, are a product of the vast changes that have taken
place in the almost 120 years since the signing of the Yakima
Treaty in 1855. These changed conditions may necessitate a modification of the
treaty. Obviously, the courts may not re-write
treaties or qualify the Indian rights thereunder. If
Treaty changes should be required, that is a matter for Congress.
Our holding that the Yakima Indian Nation may enforce its
fishing
regulations by making
arrests and
seizures off the
reservation is a very narrow one.
Off-reservation enforcement is limited strictly to violations of
tribal
fishing
regulations. The
arrest and
seizure of
fishing gear must be made at
"usual and
accustomed places" of
fishing, and only when violations are committed in the presence of the arresting
officer. n20
Tribal officers patrolling
off-reservation
sites are subject to all reasonable
regulations that may be imposed by the State of Washington for the orderly conduct of
inspections,
arrests and
seizures. Cooperation between state, local and
Tribal officials is encouraged. Ultimately,
effective
regulation of the
fishing
[**28] resource is of benefit to both Indian and non-Indian. n21
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n20 As noted
supra, Mary Settler was
arrested and the
fishing gear seized at a
"usual and
accustomed"
fishing
site for a violation committed in the presence of the arresting officers.
n21 The Yakima Nation may be in a
better position than the State of Washington to regulate
off-reservation
fishing. The
Tribe posesses the knowledge of its individual members and their
fishing
sites, and only the
Tribe has the authority to revoke a
Tribal member's
fishing privileges.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
VI. VIOLATION OF
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
Finally, Alvin Settler contends in No. 71-2364 that the district court erred in
failing to consider his contention that the
Tribal Court had violated his
constitutional rights by denying him the right to professional counsel and by trying him twice for
the same offense. The opinion of the district court noted that the original
petition alleged these additional grounds but that they
"are not now urged" by reason of provisions of the
Indian
[**29] Civil Rights Act of 1968,
25 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq. n22
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n22 The court quoted the following excerpt from the Act:
§ 1302.
Constitutional rights.
No Indian
tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall --
. . .
(3) subject any person for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy;
. . .
(6) deny to any person in a criminal proceeding . . ., and at his own expense
to have the assistance of counsel for his own defense; . . .."
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(a) Denial of Right to Professional Counsel
In Cause No. 74-1627 the parties filed a
"Stipulation as to Facts and Issues on Motions for Summary Judgment" which reads in part:
"As stated in the stipulation in No. 2454, (No. 74-1656, the Mary Settler case)
the contention as to professional counsel has been withdrawn by counsel for
Petitioner and is no longer at issue in this case, because the Yakima Indian
Nation now permits
tribal members to be represented by professional counsel in
tribal court proceedings."
The file in
74-2364 does
[**30] not contain a similar stipulation, and in that case Alvin continues to urge
this alleged denial of his
constitutional rights.
The 1967
Tribal proceedings against Alvin Settler involved misdemeanors. Section 8, Chapter 1
of the Law and Order Code of the Yakima Indian Nation prohibited the appearance
of
"professional attorneys" in
Tribal Court. n23 It did, however, provide for representation by members of the
Tribe. Alvin Settler
[*241] was offered and he rejected this representation.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n23 Similar provisions are found in many
tribal law and order codes.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Counsel have not cited nor have we found any case prior to the enactment of the
Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 which guarantees the Sixth Amendment right of counsel to Indians
appearing in
tribal courts. As noted in the legislative history of the 1968 Act,
"The Federal courts generally have refused to impose constitutional
standards on Indian
tribal governments, on the theory that such standards apply only to State or Federal
governmental action, and that
[**31] Indian
tribes are not States within the meaning of the 14th Amendment". Senate Report No. 721, 2 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1837, 1865 (90th Cong. 2nd Sess. 1968).
Senator Ervin, sponsor of the 1968 Act, described the Act in part as follows:
". . . The
reservation Indian now has no
Constitutional rights. The purpose of the amendment is to give these Indians
constitutional rights which other Americans enjoy." 14 Cong. Rec. 5836 (1968).
There are many cases supporting the conclusion that prior to the 1968 Act
constitutional rights were not applicable to Indian
tribes and Indians living on
reservations. The leading case is
Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 41 L. Ed. 196, 16 S. Ct. 986 (1896) wherein the Supreme Court held that the Fifth
Amendment was not applicable to the Cherokee Nation. The Court stated:
". . . the existence of the right in Congress to regulate the manner in which
the local powers of the Cherokee Nation shall be exercised does not render such
local powers Federal powers arising from and created by the Constitution of the
United States. It follows that as the powers of local self government enjoyed
by the Cherokee Nation existed prior to the Constitution, they are not operated
[**32] upon by the Fifth Amendment, which, as we have said, had for its sole object
to control the powers conferred by the Constitution on the National Government."
Id. at 384.
This rationale was followed in subsequent cases involving the application of
the
Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Indian Tribes. Barta v. Oglala Sioux Tribe of Pine Ridge Reservation, 259 F.2d 553 (8 Cir. 1958), cert. den.,
358 U.S. 932, 3 L. Ed. 2d 304, 79 S. Ct. 320 (1959);
Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe of Southern Ute Reservation, 249 F.2d 915 (10 Cir. 1957), cert. den.,
356 U.S. 960, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1067, 78 S. Ct. 998 (1958);
Native American Church of North America v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131 (10 Cir. 1959). Felix Cohen concluded in his treatise on Indian law:
"Many important prohibitions, including the Bill of Rights of the Federal
Constitution, are limitations only on the power of the Federal Government.
Other provisions limit the activities of state governments only, or of the
federal and state governments, and hence are inapplicable to Indian
tribes, which are not creatures of either the federal or state governments." Cohen, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (1942) p.
[**33] 181.
Following Talton
v. Mayes and the other cases cited
supra, it was held in
Glover v. United States, 219 F. Supp. 19, 21 (D. Mont. 1963), that
"the provisions of the Federal Constitution guaranteeing . . . the right to
counsel do not apply in prosecutions in
tribal courts". As the court stated:
"The right to be represented by counsel is protected by the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments. These amendments, however, protect these rights only as against
action by the United States in the case of the Fifth and Sixth amendments, and
as against action by the states in the case of the Fourteenth Amendment. Indian
tribes are not states within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment."
Here the proceedings in
Tribal Court occurred prior to the enactment of the
Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968. Accordingly we find no merit in the contention that the
Tribal Court deprived petitioner of his
constitutional rights by denying
[*242] him
representation by professional counsel. n24
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n24 As noted
supra, the
Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 provides that no Indian
tribe shall deny to any person in a criminal proceeding the right
"at his own expense to have the assistance of counsel for his defense". It is unnecessary to decide whether the furnishing of non-professional
tribal counsel to indigent defendants would comply with the Act.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
[**34]
(b) Claim of
Double Jeopardy
The only reference to the claim of
double jeopardy in the record submitted to this court appears in the petition filed on
November 6, 1967 in 71-2364. As noted
supra, Alvin Settler was
convicted in
Tribal Court of
fishing violations on July 14, 1967 and August 8, 1967 and for a third offense of
violating lawful orders of the
Tribal Court. The petition alleged that in
Tribal Cause 11316, involving the
offense committed on July 14, 1967, Settler was tried, found guilty, and
sentenced to a 30 day suspension (from
fishing activities) or $80.00 fine; that the court discovered that the prosecutor had
testified to the allegations in case 11538 (the offense committed on August 8)
by mistake and to correct the error set aside the conviction in 11316 and
"proceeded to retry petitioner upon the same charge but with a corrected
recitation of allegations pertinent to July 14, 1967". Upon completion of the second trial, the same sentence was imposed.
Assuming the correctness of the allegations in the petition, n25 the retrial
did not constitute
double jeopardy.
See
Ball v. United States, 163 U.S. 662, 672, 41 L. Ed. 300, 16 S. Ct. 1192 (1896);
United
[**35] States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 465, 12 L. Ed. 2d 448, 84 S. Ct. 1587 (1964);
United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 124-125, 15 L. Ed. 2d 627, 86 S. Ct. 773 (1966). n26
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n25 The certificate of proceedings of the
Tribal Judge makes no reference to the facts alleged in the petition on which the
claim of
double jeopardy is based. These facts were not, however, denied in respondents' answer.
n26 Moreover, as indicated
supra, the constitutional prohibition against
double jeopardy would not have been applicable since the
tribal proceedings occurred prior to the
Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
The judgments of dismissal in No. 71-2364 and No. 74-1627 are affirmed. The
judgment in No. 74-1656 is reversed, and the cause remanded for dismissal of
the petition.
|
|