|
|
|
Document:
U.S. v. Washington, Phase II
UNITED STATES of America et al., Plaintiffs, v. STATE OF WASHINGTON et al.,
Defendants
Civ. No. 9213 -- Phase II
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
506 F. Supp. 187;
1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17152;
11 ELR 20016
September 26, 1980
COUNSEL:
[**1]
William A. White, Atty.,
Indian Resources Section, Land
& Natural Resources Div., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., George D. Dysart,
Atty., Dept. of Justice, Land
& Natural Resources Div., Portland, Oregon, for the U. S.
Alan C. Stay, Phillip E. Katzen, Evergreen Legal Services, Seattle, Washington,
for Jamestown Band-Clallam, Lower Elwha, Muckleshoot, Nisqually, Nooksack, Port
Gamble Band-Clallam, Samish, Sauk-Suiattle, Skokomish, Snohomish, Snoqualmie,
Squaxin Island, Steilacoom, Stillaguamish, Suquamish and Upper Skagit Tribes.
Mason D. Morisset, Steven S. Anderson, Ziontz, Pirtle, Morisset, Ernstoff
& Chestnut, Seattle, Washington, for Lummi, Makah, Quileute and Tulalip Tribes.
John Clinebell, Tacoma, Washington, William H. Rodgers, Jr., Seattle,
Washington, for Puyallup
Tribe.
Peter J. Wilke, Bellevue, Washington, for Swinomish
Indian Tribal Community.
Joanne Eileen Foster, Taholah, Washington, for Quinault Tribe.
Alan C. Alhadeff, Alhadeff, Leavitt
& Wesley, Seattle, Washington, for Dwamish Tribe.
James B. Hovis, Hovis, Cockrill
& Roy, Yakima, Washington, for Yakima
Indian Nation.
Daniel A. Raas, Bellingham, Washington, for Lummi Tribe.
Susan Kay Hvalsoe,
[**2] Cullen, Holm, Hoglund
& Foster, Olympia, Washington, for Hoh
Indian Tribe.
Slade Gorton, Atty. Gen., Edward B. Mackie, Deputy Atty. Gen., State of
Washington, Olympia, Washington, for State of Wash.
James M. Johnson, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Dennis Reynolds, Asst. Atty. Gen.,
Dept. of Game, State of Washington, Olympia, Washington, for Departments of
Fisheries and Game.
Charles E. Yates, Moriarty, Long, Mikkelborg
& Broz, Seattle, Washington, for Reefnet Owners Assn.
Joseph T. Mijich, John P. World, Seattle, Washington, for Purse Seine Vessel
Owners Ass'n, amicus curiae.
OPINIONBY: ORRICK
OPINION:
[*189]
OPINION
This opinion constitutes but the most recent link in a long chain of opinions
construing the following 27 words:
"The right of taking
fish, at all usual and
accustomed grounds and stations, is further secured to said
Indians, in common with all citizens of the Territory, * * *." n1
The quoted clause appears in six
treaties negotiated between the United States and several Pacific Northwest
Indian
tribes in 1854 and 1855. n2 The
Indians traded their interest in the land west of the Cascade
[*190] Mountains and north of the Columbia River for the exclusive
[**3] use of small land parcels (reservations), cash payments, and various guarantees, including, of prime importance in
1854-1855 as well as today, the right to continue
fishing. In each of the seven cases where the Supreme Court has directly addressed
the scope of the
fishing clause in these
treaties, it has
"placed a relatively broad
gloss on the
Indians'
fishing rights."
Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n., 443 U.S. 658, 679, 99 S. Ct. 3055, 3071, 61 L. Ed. 2d 823 (1979). n3
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
1. Article III,
Treaty of Medicine Creek, 10 Stat. 1133 (1855). The balance of Article III is as
follows:
" * * * and of erecting temporary houses for the purpose of curing, together
with the privilege of hunting, gathering roots and berries, and pasturing their
horses on open and unclaimed lands: Provided, however, That they shall not take
shell
fish from any beds staked or cultivated by citizens."
n2. Articles identical or substantially identical to Article III of the
Treaty of Medicine Creek are contained in the
Treaty of Point Elliott, 12 Stat. 927 (1859), the
Treaty of Point No Point, 12 Stat. 933 (1859), the
Treaty with the
Makah (Treaty of Neah Bay), 12 Stat. 939 (1859), the
Treaty with the Yakimas, 12 Stat. 951 (1859), and the
Treaty with the Quinault (Treaty of Olympia), 12 Stat. 971 (1859).
The following
tribes, or their predecessors in interest, were parties to the
treaties and have intervened in this litigation: Muckleshoot, Nisqually, Puyallup,
Squaxin Island (Treaty of Medicine Creek); Lummi, Nooksack, Sauk-Suiattle, Stillaguamish, Suquamish,
Swinomish, Tulalip, Upper Skagit (Treaty of Point Elliott); Lower Elwha Band of Clallam, Port Gamble Band of Clallam,
Skokomish (Treaty of Point No Point); Makah (Treaty of Neah Bay); Yakima (Treaty with the Yakimas); Hoh, Quileute, and Quinaults (Treaty of Olympia).
United States v. State of Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 349 (W.D.Wash.1974) ("Final Decision I
"), aff'd
520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1086, 96 S. Ct. 877, 47 L. Ed. 2d 97 (1976);
United States v. State of Washington, 459 F. Supp. 1020, 1039-1042 (W.D.Wash.1974-1978) ("Post-Trial Decisions"), various appeals dismissed,
573 F.2d 1117 (9th Cir. 1978), 573 F.2d 1118 (9th Cir. 1978), 573 F.2d 1121 (9th Cir. 1978), decisions at
459 F. Supp. 1020, 1097-1118 (W.D.Wash.1977-1978), aff'd sub nom.
Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n v. United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, 573 F.2d 1123 (9th Cir. 1978), aff'd in part, vacated in part, and remanded
sub nom.
Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 99 S. Ct. 3055, 61 L. Ed. 2d 823 (1979) ("Washington
Phase I
").
Although the Makah
Tribe and the Yakima Nation were organized entities prior to the negotiation of the
treaties, many of the
"tribes" were actually loose aggregations of individuals and the federal officials
deemed them to be
tribes and appointed
"chiefs" for the purpose of negotiating the
treaties.
Washington Phase I, supra, 443 U.S. at 664 n.5, 99 S. Ct. at 3064 n.5.
[**4]
n3. The other six cases, in chronological order, are:
United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 25 S. Ct. 662, 49 L. Ed. 1089 (1905);
Seufert Bros. Co. v. United States, 249 U.S. 194, 39 S. Ct. 203, 63 L. Ed. 555 (1918);
Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 62 S. Ct. 862, 86 L. Ed. 1115 (1942);
Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game, 391 U.S. 392, 88 S. Ct. 1725, 20 L. Ed. 2d 689 (1968) ("Puyallup I
");
Department of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. 44, 94 S. Ct. 330, 38 L. Ed. 2d 254 (1973) ("Puyallup II
");
Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 97 S. Ct. 2616, 53 L. Ed. 2d 667 (1977) ("Puyallup III
").
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
This complex case, which was commenced in 1970 by the United States on its own
behalf and as trustee of seven
Indian
tribes,
n4 involves three key issues: (1) whether the
treaties'
fishing clause entitles the
Indians to a specific allocation of the
salmon and
steelhead trout n5 in the
"case area"; n6 (2) if such allocation is required, whether
hatchery-bred and artificially-propagated
fish are included in the allocable
fish population; and (3) whether the right of taking
fish incorporates
[**5] the right to have
treaty
fish protected from
environmental degradation.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n4. Initially, the United States brought suit on behalf of the Hoh, Makah,
Muckleshoot, Nisqually, Puyallup, Quileute, and Skokomish
tribes. Subsequently, those
tribes and the following others intervened as plaintiffs on their own behalf:
Duwamish, Jamestown Band of Clallam, Lower Elwha Samish, Sauk-Suiattle,
Snohomish, Snoqualmie, Tulalip, Upper Skagit River, Tulalip, and Yakima.
The defendants are the State of Washington ("State"), the Washington Department of
Fisheries ("Fisheries"), the Washington Game Department ("Game"), their respective
directors, and the Washington Reef Net Owners Association. Numerous agencies
and interested organizations have participated actively as amici curiae.
n5. The
fish covered by the
treaties include the chinook, chum, coho, pink, and sockeye species of
salmon as well as
steelhead trout. Those who
fish for
salmon do so primarily for commercial purposes and are subject to
regulation by
Fisheries;
steelhead trout are sought primarily by recreational
fishermen, subject to Game's regulatory authority. The five
salmon species and
steelhead trout will be referred to collectively, unless otherwise noted, as
"fish" or
"salmon."
[**6]
n6. The geographical area that is the subject of the
treaties and this litigation is
"that portion of the State of Washington west of the Cascade Mountains and north
of the Columbia River drainage area, * * * (including) the American portion of
the Puget Sound watershed, the watersheds of the Olympic Peninsula north of the
Grays Harbor watershed, and the offshore
waters adjacent to those areas.
Final Decision I, supra n.2, 384 F. Supp. at 328.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
[*191] The case has been litigated in two
phases. In
Phase I, which focused on the allocation issue, a series of trial and appellate
court decisions culminated in a 1979 Supreme Court opinion which conclusively
established the
tribes' treaty-based right to take the lesser of 50 percent of the
"harvestable" case area
fish or a sufficient quantity of
fish to provide them with a
moderate standard of living.
United States v. State of Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D.Wash.1974) ("Final Decision I"), aff'd
520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1086, 96 S. Ct. 877, 47 L. Ed. 2d 97 (1976);
United States v. State of Washington, 459 F. Supp.
[**7] 1020 (W.D.Wash.1974-1978) ("Post-Trial Decisions"), various appeals dismissed,
573 F.2d 1117 (9th Cir. 1978), 573 F.2d 1118 (9th Cir. 1978), 573 F.2d 1121 (9th Cir. 1978), decisions at
459 F. Supp. 1020, 1097-1118 (W.D.Wash.1977-1978), aff'd sub nom.
Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n v. United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, 573 F.2d 1123 (9th Cir. 1978), aff'd in part, vacated in part, and remanded sub nom.
Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 685-687, 99 S. Ct. 3055, 3074-3075, 61 L. Ed. 2d 823 (1979) ("Washington
Phase I"). While retaining jurisdiction to ensure the implementation of the
Phase I-decreed allocation, the Court here considers the
hatchery and
environmental issues which were raised in
Phase I but
reserved for decision in
Phase II. n7 Currently pending are the parties' cross-motions for
partial
summary judgment on the
hatchery issue and plaintiffs' motion for
partial
summary judgment on the
environmental issue. Bound and informed by the numerous decisions heretofore rendered in
this case, particularly the recent Supreme Court opinion, having found no
genuine issue as to any material fact,
[**8] and for the additional reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that
plaintiffs are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the
hatchery issue and on that aspect of the
environmental issue thus far presented for adjudication.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n7.
Final Decision I, supra n.2, 384 F. Supp. at 328, 344-345.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
I
The
treaties in question were negotiated between Isaac Stevens, the first Governor and
first Superintendent of
Indian Affairs of the Washington Territory, and
tribal representatives. Few contemporaneous documents explicate the parties'
intentions regarding the scope of and limitations on the
tribes'
fishing right. For the simple reason that
fish were plentiful in 1854-1855 but have since become relatively scarce, the
allocation,
hatchery and
environmental issues which all arise from the fact of scarcity were not addressed. n8
However, the extensive record developed in connection with this litigation and
recounted in the many opinions issued to date provides considerable insight
into the
treaty negotiations. Preceding
[**9] opinions have spelled out in impressive detail the parties' intentions and the
surrounding circumstances, as well as relevant subsequent events; only a
capsule
summary is necessary here. n9
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n8.
"Because of the great abundance of
fish and the limited population of the area, it simply was not contemplated that
either party would interfere with the other's
fishing rights. The parties accordingly did not see the need and did not intend to
regulate the taking of
fish by either
Indians or non-Indians, nor was future
regulation foreseen."
Washington Phase I, supra n.2, 443 U.S. at 668, 99 S. Ct. at 3065, citing
Final Decision I, supra n.2, 384 F. Supp. at 334, 355, 357.
n9. The many facts regarding the construction of these
treaties which were found and affirmed on appeal in
Phase I are binding on the parties in this second
phase of the case. Puget Sound Gillnetters, supra n.2, 573 F.2d at 1129;
Post-Trial Decisions, supra n.2, 459 F. Supp. at 1094 (Memorandum Decision Denying Disqualification).
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
When the
[**10]
treaties were negotiated,
fish were the mainstay of the
Indians' economy and the focal point of their culture.
"All of (the otherwise-diverse
tribes) shared a vital and unifying dependence on anadromous
fish."
Washington Phase I, supra, 443 U.S. at 664, 99 S. Ct. at 3064. See also
id. at
[*192] 665-666, 99 S. Ct. at 3064-3065 and other
Phase I opinions cited therein. n10
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n10.
Salmon (including
steelhead trout), the
fish covered by these
treaties, are anadromous
fish. They hatch in fresh
water, spend their adult lives in the ocean, and then return to their native
fresh-water
streams to spawn and die.
Washington Phase I, supra n.2, 443 U.S. at 662-663, 99 S. Ct. at 3062-3063.
Steelhead trout may return to
spawn more than once before dying.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
An essential element of consideration for which the
Indians bargained was the right to continue
fishing as they had always done.
"It is perfectly clear * * * that they were invited by the white negotiators to
rely and in fact did rely heavily on the good faith of the
[**11] United States to protect that right."
Id. at 667, 99 S. Ct. at 3065. n11
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n11. The oft-quoted statement of Governor Stevens to the
Indians negotiating the
Treaty of Point-No-Point epitomizes this fact:
"Are you not my children and also children of the Great Father? What will I not
do for my children, and what will you not for yours? Would you not die for
them? This paper is such as a man would give to his children and I will tell
you why. This paper gives you a home. Does not a father give his children a
home? * * * This paper secures your
fish? (sic) Does
not a father give food to his children?"
Washington Phase I, supra n.2, 443 U.S. at 667 n.11, 99 S. Ct. at 3065 n.11.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
In 1854-1855,
Indians constituted approximately 75 percent of the 10,000-person case area population
and accounted for most of the
fishing activity. n12 In 1974,
Indians represented approximately 10.8 percent of case area's commercial
fishermen n13 and they netted 2.4 percent of the commercial
catch. n14 The dramatic decline in the
[**12]
Indians' case-area
fishing activity is attributable to such factors as the settlement of the West by
predominantly non-Indians and the industrialization of
fishing and related activities, n15 acculturation of
Indians into non-Indian forms of employment, n16 belated access of
Indian
fishermen to the
salmon runs by virtue of the location of
Indians'
fishing sites, n17 and the discriminatory manner in which state officials have applied
fishing laws and
regulations to
Indian
fishermen. n18
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n12.
Id. at 664, 99 S. Ct. at 3063.
n13. When Final Decision I was issued in 1974, there were approximately 794
Indian
fishermen and 6,600 commercial
fishermen in the case area. By way of contrast, there were 283,650 sport
fishermen.
Final Decision I, supra n.2, 384 F. Supp. at 387. See also
Washington Phase I, supra n.2, 443 U.S. at 664, 99 S. Ct. at 3063.
n14. As of August, 1974,
Indians harvested 89,402
salmon and non-Indian commercial
fishermen harvested 3,628,513 during the 1974 season.
Post-Trial Decisions, supra n.2, 459 F. Supp. at 1032 (Decision, Injunction and Order re
State Court Injunctions).
[**13]
n15.
Final Decision I, supra n.2, 384 F. Supp. at 406-407.
n16.
Id. at 358.
n17.
Id. at 389.
n18.
Id. at 388, 403-404. See also
Washington Phase I, supra n.2, 433 U.S. at 668-669, 99 S. Ct. at 3065-3066.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
The most salient effect of
Phase I was to reverse this trend and place
Indian
fishermen on an equal footing with non-Indians. In February, 1974, following a month-long trial and several months of
post-trial briefing and argument, Judge Boldt held that the
treaty language securing to the
Indians
"the right of taking
fish * * * in common with all citizens" entitles them to up to 50 percent of the
harvestable
fish passing through the
tribes' usual and
accustomed
fishing grounds.
Final Decision I, supra, 384 F. Supp. at 343-344. The quantity of
harvestable
fish subject to the 50/50 allocation between
Indians and non-Indians was to be computed by subtracting the following categories of
fish from all those within the case area: (1)
fish taken on, rather than off of,
Indian
reservations; (2)
fish taken at off-reservation sites other than the
tribes' usual and
accustomed
fishing grounds;
[**14] (3)
fish taken by the
tribes for ceremonial and subsistence needs; and (4)
fish not to be taken at all but to
"escape" for
spawning or conservation purposes. In addition, Judge Boldt called for an equitable
adjustment augmenting the
tribes' share because non-Indians take a
"substantially disproportionate" number of the
fish caught offshore that would otherwise have passed through the
tribes'
fishing grounds.
Id. at 344. Finally,
[*193] Judge Boldt abstained from deciding whether
hatchery-bred
fish should be excluded from the allocable
fish population.
Id. at 344-345. n19 The Ninth Circuit affirmed Judge Boldt's allocation in all significant
respects, modifying only the formula for computing the equitable adjustment.
United States v. State of Washington, supra, 520 F.2d 676. n20 Initially, the Supreme Court denied certiorari.
423 U.S. 1086, 96 S. Ct. 877, 47 L. Ed. 2d 97. However, the Court later reviewed Judge Boldt's rulings when a conflict arose
between the Washington state courts, which enjoined the State's Department of
Fisheries ("Fisheries") from enforcing
regulations designed to implement the allocation decision, n21 and the federal courts,
which had decreed and undertook
[**15] directly to implement the treaty-based allocation. n22 The Court consolidated
the state and federal court proceedings, affirmed and adopted Judge Boldt's
construction of the
treaties, and upheld, with slight modification, his allocation decision.
Washington Phase I, supra. The Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's modification of the equitable
adjustment formula, and further modified the computation of allocable
fish by including: (1)
fish taken on-reservation as well as those taken off-reservation; (2)
fish taken off-reservation at sites other than the
tribes' usual and
accustomed
fishing sites; (3)
fish taken by the
tribes for ceremonial and subsistence needs.
Id., 443 U.S. at 687-688, 99 S. Ct. at 3075-3076. The Court amplified the 50/50 allocation ruling by emphasizing that the
crucial determinant of the
tribes'
treaty share is that quantity of
fish sufficient to provide a
moderate standard of living, subject to a ceiling of 50 percent of the
harvestable
fish.
"The 50% figure imposes a maximum but not a
minimum allocation * * *. The central principle here must be that
Indian
treaty rights to a natural resource that once was thoroughly and exclusively
exploited by the
Indians
[**16] secures so much as, but no more than, is necessary to provide the
Indians with a livelihood that is to say, a
moderate living."
Id. at 686, 99 S. Ct. at 3075.
See also
Final Decision I, supra, 384 F. Supp. at 401-402. Finally, the Court noted that this Court had not yet reached a final decision
on the
hatchery issue and therefore expressed no opinion as to
"whether the
treaties give
Indians the same right to take
hatchery-bred
fish as they do to take native
fish."
Id., 443 U.S. at 689 n.30, 99 S. Ct. at 3076 n.30.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n19. In Final Decision I, Judge Boldt's consideration of the
hatchery issue was limited to the question whether
hatchery-bred
steelhead trout should be excluded from the allocation. That question had been raised, but
not answered, in Puyallup II, which concerned the application of the
treaties'
fishing clause to the State's attempts to regulate
steelhead trout
fishing. The
hatchery issue thus entered this litigation collaterally, as a spin-off from Puyallup
II, and was later broadened by the parties here to the question whether all
hatchery-bred
fish should be excluded from the allocation. See
Post-Trial Decisions, supra n.2, 459 F. Supp. at 1072 (Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Preliminary Injunction re
Hatchery Propagated
Fish).
[**17]
n20. The Ninth Circuit held that
fish taken offshore by non-Washington citizens should not be considered in
calculating an equitable adjustment to the
tribes' share. United States v. State of Washington, supra n.2, 520 F.2d 676, 689,
693 (9th Cir.
1975).
n21.
Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n v. Tollefson, 89 Wash.2d 276, 571 P.2d 1373 (1977);
Purse Seine Vessel Owners Ass'n v. Moos, 88 Wash.2d 799, 567 P.2d 205 (1977);
Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n v. Moos, 88 Wash.2d 677, 565 P.2d 1151 (1977). These cases stymied
Fisheries' attempts to implement Judge Boldt's decision; Game had not even attempted to
adopt implementing
regulations. The various efforts by the State courts, State agencies, and interested
organizations to undermine and nullify Judge Boldt's rulings (and the Ninth
Circuit's affirmance thereof) were described by the Ninth Circuit as
"the most concerted official and private efforts to frustrate a decree of a
federal court witnessed in this
century," save for some desegregation cases. Puget Sound Gillnetters, supra n.2, 573
F.2d at 1126. See generally id. at 1128-1130;
Washington Phase I, supra n.2, 443 U.S. at 672-674, 99 S. Ct. at 3067, 3068.
[**18]
n22.
Post-Trial Decisions, supra n.2, various appeals dismissed,
573 F.2d 1117 (9th Cir. 1978), 573 F.2d 1118 (9th Cir. 1978), 573 F.2d 1121 (9th Cir. 1978), decisions at
459 F. Supp. at 1097-1118, aff'd sub nom.
Puget Sound Gillnetters, 573 F.2d 1123 (9th Cir. 1978).
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
[*194] In August, 1976, several months after the Supreme Court denied certiorari in
the first round of
Phase I, the plaintiffs formally commenced
Phase II by filing amended and supplemental complaints. The State responded with an
answer and counterclaim. The issues were further refined through joint and
separate statements of the issues to be resolved in
Phase II. After considerable discovery and pretrial preparation, the plaintiffs
moved for
partial
summary judgment on the issue
"whether the federal
treaty
fishing right reserves to
treaty
tribes a right to have the
fishery resource protected from adverse
environmental actions or inactions of the State of Washington." n23 Excluded from the scope of the plaintiffs' motion, and not yet presented
to the Court for resolution, are two subsidiary
environmental issues: (1) whether,
[**19] if such right exists, the State has violated it; and (2) what remedies, if
any, are appropriate. After extensive briefing by all parties, the Court heard
oral argument on May 11, 1979. The Supreme Court's opinion in the second round
of
Phase
I was handed down two months thereafter, and the parties submitted additional
briefs regarding the significance of that opinion in relation to the pending
environmental issue.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n23. Joint Statement of Issues, P I.1 (June 23, 1978). See also PP III.1-7.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Following a status conference in September, 1979, the parties filed
cross-motions for
summary judgment on the issue
"whether the federal
treaty
fishing right includes all, some or no artificially-reared
fish released into public
waters." n24 Each party supported its motion with statements of facts and legal
contentions, briefs, and affidavits n25 in accordance with the procedures
outlined in Section 3.30 of the Manual for Complex Litigation. Oral argument
took place on April 10, 1980, and, after the parties filed supplementary
[**20] factual material, both the
hatchery and the
environmental issues were deemed submitted.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n24. Id., P I.4. See also PP I.5-6, III.8, and IV.1-2.
n25. The State moved to strike all or portions of eight of the nine affidavits
submitted by plaintiffs. The State objects to Alan Stay's affidavit on the
ground that it does not lay a proper foundation for the government report
attached thereto. Plaintiffs filed two affidavits of Mr. Stay. One, dated
January 21, 1980, identifies an attached document. The other, dated March 7,
1980, summarizes data he received from the Northwest
Indian
Fisheries Commission. In response to the State's motion to strike, the plaintiffs
withdrew the latter Stay affidavit and replaced it with the affidavit of
Michael Grayum, Assistant Director for
Fishery Management Services of the Northwest
Indian
Fisheries Commission. Although this substitution of affidavits does
not address the State's objections to the first Stay affidavit, the Court
independently denies the motion to strike that affidavit. The attached
document is adequately authenticated and therefore admissible for purposes of
the
summary judgment motion. The State objects to plaintiffs' remaining affidavits (i. e., those
of Howard Carlisle, Donald Chapman, Howard Droker, William Hershberger, Barbara
Lane, Peter Larkin, and Phillip Mundy) on the grounds that they are not
relevant or material (insofar as they pertain to historical events or
environmental conditions), are not competent (insofar as the affiants state their own
opinions), and are speculative (insofar as conclusions are not supported by
facts). The Court denies the State's motion to strike these affidavits. The
objections generally lack merit and, to the extent that they are meritorious,
the affidavits need not be striken. Specifically, the Court overrules the
State's relevance objection. The historical and
environmental information is relevant to determining the relationship between
hatchery-bred
fish and the
wild
fish that are indisputably subject to the
treaty. The State's competency objection is overruled because the relevant affiants
are experts. The State's strongest argument is that plaintiffs' affidavits
lack sufficient factual support. However, this does not call for the striking
of the affidavits because the parties' posthearing submissions adequately
supplement the factual bases underlying the material facts stated in the
affidavits. Moreover, many of the objected-to statements in plaintiffs'
affidavits do not pertain to facts material to the resolution of the
hatchery issue. All parties agreed at oral argument that there are no genuine issues
of material fact precluding resolution of the
hatchery issue by way of
summary judgment. Finally, the Court has relied on plaintiffs' affidavits only as and where
they are cited herein.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
[**21]
II
In analyzing the allocation issue in
Phase I, it was possible to rely on the express language of the
treaties, as well as the parties' intentions and surrounding circumstances,
[*195] in construing the
treaties'
fishing clause. In particular, the 50/50 allocation between
treaty and nontreaty
fishermen was derived from the
"in common with" provision in that clause.
Washington Phase I, supra, 443 U.S. at 685-686, 99 S. Ct. at 3074-3075;
Final Decision I, supra, 384 F. Supp. at 343. However, none of the express terms in the
fishing clause pertain to the
hatchery or
environmental issues. Canons of interpreting
Indian
treaties accordingly assume especial significance in ascertaining the
treaties' implicit meaning with respect to those issues.
Indian
treaties must be interpreted so as to promote their central purposes.
United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381, 25 S. Ct. 662, 664, 49 L. Ed. 1089 (1905). They must be read
"in light of the common notions of the day and the assumptions of those who
drafted them."
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 206, 98 S. Ct. 1011, 1020, 55 L. Ed. 2d 209 (1978). The Supreme Court has been notably attentive to the intentions
[**22] and assumptions of the
Indians as they entered into the
treaties.
"The United States, as the party with the presumptively superior negotiating
skills and superior knowledge of the language in which the
treaty is recorded, has a responsibility to avoid taking advantage of the other side.
"(T)he
treaty must therefore be construed, not according to the technical meaning of its
words to learned lawyers, but in the sense in which they would naturally be
understood by the
Indians.'
"
Washington Phase I, supra, 443 U.S. at 675-676, 99 S. Ct. at 3069-3070, quoting in part from
Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 11, 20 S. Ct. 1, 5, 44 L. Ed. 49 (1899).
See also
Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 684-685, 62 S. Ct. 862, 864, 86 L. Ed. 1115 (1942). Any ambiguities must be resolved in the
Indians' favor;
"the wording of
treaties * * * with the
Indians is not to be construed to their prejudice."
Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 199, 95 S. Ct. 944, 948, 43 L. Ed. 2d 129 (1975). See also
Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 631, 90 S. Ct. 1328, 1334, 25 L. Ed. 2d 615 (1970). The Supreme Court has repeatedly relied on the rule of attending to the
Indians' common-sense understanding
[**23] of the
treaties
"in broadly interpreting these very
treaties in the
Indians' favor."
Washington Phase I, supra, 443 U.S. at 676, 99 S. Ct. at 3070.
III
A
Prior to 1973, the
State had never drawn a distinction in either its legal arguments or its
fisheries programs between natural and
hatchery-bred
fish. The State initially proposed that distinction in oral argument before the
Supreme Court in a case involving discriminatory state
regulation of
steelhead trout
fishing in the Puyallup River. In the course of striking down the state
regulation as impermissible infringement upon the Puyallup
Tribe's treaty-based
fishing right, the Supreme Court expressly
reserved ruling on whether the existence of a license fee-funded
hatchery program should affect the allocation of
steelhead trout under the
fishing clause.
Department of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. 44, 48, 94 S. Ct. 330, 333, 38 L. Ed. 2d 254 (1973) ("Puyallup II
"). n26
[*196] In a concurring opinion,
three Justices suggested that the
Indians'
treaty right should not extend to
hatchery
fish subsidized by non-Indian sport
fishermen.
Id. at 49-50, 94 S. Ct. at 333-334.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n26. In
Puyallup I, supra n.3, the Supreme Court held that off-reservation
treaty
fishing is subject to State
regulation, limited to
"nondiscriminatory measures for conserving
fish resources."
Id., 391 U.S. at 399, 88 S. Ct. at 1729. The case was remanded to the State courts, giving rise to Puyallup II, for the
determination of whether the challenged
regulation (a ban on set net
fishing) was necessary for conservation purposes and whether it was nondiscriminatory.
The State courts upheld the
regulation,
80 Wash.2d 561, 497 P.2d 171 (1972), but the Supreme Court struck it down as discriminatory
"because all
Indian net
fishing is barred and only hook-and-line
fishing entirely preempted by non-Indians, is allowed." Puyallup II, supra n.3, 414 U.S. at 48, 94 S. Ct. at 333. The case was again
remanded to establish a formula for apportioning the
steelhead
fishery between
Indians and non-Indians. The State courts held that the state could regulate
tribal
fishing on as well as off of the
reservation, and a limitation was imposed on the number of
steelhead trout that
treaty
fishermen could
catch each year.
86 Wash.2d 664, 548 P.2d 1058 (1976). The Supreme Court held that although the
tribe was immune from suit under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the individual
members of the
tribe were proper parties and were subject to
regulation by the state both on as well as off of their
reservation.
Puyallup III, supra n.3.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
[**24]
On remand, the
State courts converted that suggestion into a ruling. Department of Game v.
Puyallup
Tribe, No. 158069 (Super.Ct.1975), aff'd
86 Wash.2d 664, 548 P.2d 1058 (1976). Although the Puyallup litigation involved
fishing by the Puyallup
Tribe (but not the other 20
tribes that are parties to this litigation) for
steelhead trout (but not the other five species of
salmon that are the subject of this litigation) in the Puyallup River (but not the
entire case area), the State moved to exclude all
hatchery
fish from the 50 percent
treaty share to which Judge Boldt had declared all of the
Indians in this case to be entitled. Judge Boldt then enjoined the State from
extending the State court's holding beyond the Puyallup parties and subject
matter.
Post-Trial Decisions, supra, 459 F. Supp. at 1042 (following Pierce County
Superior Court decision) and at 1072 (following Washington Supreme Court
decision). When the State court's ruling was reviewed by the Supreme Court,
the case was decided on other grounds and the Court again declined to address
the
hatchery issue.
Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 177 n.17, 97 S. Ct. 2616, 2623-2624 n.17, 53 L. Ed. 2d 667 (1977)
[**25] ("Puyallup III
"). In short, none of the numerous federal opinions in the Puyallup trilogy
addresses the merits of the
hatchery issue; neither the governing law nor the applicable facts were discussed, much
less adjudicated. See
Post-Trial Decisions, supra, 459 F. Supp. at 1079 (Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Preliminary Injunction re
Hatchery Propagated
Fish). Throughout
Phase I, which was litigated concurrently with Puyallup
II and III,
hatchery
fish have been legally indistinguishable from natural
fish.
B
Although the legal status of
hatchery
fish did not assume significance until 1973, the State's
hatchery program has been in existence since 1895. n27 The
hatchery activities of the
Fisheries and Game Departments have steadily increased since that time, particularly in
the more recent years. n28 Currently, the State operates 19
steelhead trout and 16
salmon
hatcheries in the case area. n29 Another 16 facilities provide limited
salmon production assistance. n30 The State-run facilities are funded by federal and
local, as well as State, monies. n31
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n27. The first
salmon
hatchery in Washington was built in 1895 and the first
steelhead trout
hatchery activity commenced in 1903. Plaintiffs' fact statement 27, defendants' fact
statements
23.3 and 14.1, and
corresponding admissions thereof. (The fact statements and admissions are contained in the
parties' Manual
§ 3.30 briefs. Each side presented its own statement of facts and legal
contentions, to which the other side responded by admission, denial, or
objection.)
[**26]
n28. See generally defendants' fact statements 15, 20, 23, 28, 31 (including
subparts) and 21.6, and
corresponding admissions.
n29. Defendants' fact statements 15.15 and 23.8-23.9, and
corresponding admissions.
n30. Defendants' fact statement 27.3 and
corresponding admission. The 16 full-scale
hatcheries in the case area are called primary units and they
"have the capacity to collect, hold and spawn adults, to incubate eggs, and to
hatch and rear juvenile
salmon." The other 16 facilities are satellites of each of the primary units and they
have
"racks, rearing and/or holding ponds." Defendants' fact statements 27.2-27.3, and
corresponding admissions.
n31. Although the record does not presently establish, beyond dispute, the
precise share of the federal and local contributions to the State's
hatchery program, the fact of such contributions is undisputed. See State's proposed
stipulation of facts
§ III, and plaintiffs' response to Court's request for additional information at
17-23. (At the
hatcheries hearing on April 10, 1980, the Court directed the parties to submit a
supplementary stipulation of facts in response to three specific questions.
Each side subsequently filed a separate response. With respect to the first
and second questions, the parties are in substantial agreement. The plaintiffs
have not responded to the third question because they claim to lack the
requisite data. The discrepancies between the parties' submissions do not
preclude
summary judgment because there is no dispute regarding the relevant use of the data to
illustrate the patterns and trends characterizing the State's
hatcheries program. For the purposes of the
plaintiffs' motion for
summary judgment, all real and apparent factual disputes are resolved herein in favor of the
State.)
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
[**27]
[*197] Additional
hatcheries in the case area are operated by entities other than the State. Some
facilities are sponsored by the United States
Fish and Wildlife Service, some are sponsored by various
tribal governments, and others are cooperative ventures between the State and
tribes or private parties. n32
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n32. State's proposed stipulation,
§ II (as amended by letter of August 15, 1980), and plaintiffs' response, Table
II-1.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
An estimated 371,000,000
salmon and 8,755,000
steelhead trout were released into the State's
waters from federal, State,
tribal, and all other
hatcheries during the 1978-1979 season (i. e., July 1978-June 1979). n33
Hatchery
fish presently account for 60 percent of the
steelhead and
17 percent of the
salmon in the case area. n34 The relative size of the
hatchery population varies considerably among the different
salmon species;
hatchery
fish constitute as much as 63 percent of the chinook in the case area and there are
virtually no hatchery-propagated pink and sockeye
salmon. n35
[**28] Because
salmon return to their native
streams to spawn, the placement of
hatcheries has a tremendous impact on the proportion of propagated and natural
fish in each geographically distinct population.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n33. Supplemental affidavit of Robert Hager, attachment 2, at 3.
n34. State's proposed stipulation,
§ II (as amended by letter of August 15, 1980), and plaintiffs' response, Table
II-1.
n35. Id.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Once released from
hatchery facilities, artificially-bred
fish mature and reproduce in the same manner as natural
fish.
Hatchery and natural
stocks of the same species often occupy the same harvest management area at the
same time. n36
Hatchery and natural
fish generally resemble each other, although sophisticated techniques are being
developed to attempt to differentiate between them. n37 Whether such techniques
are reasonably accurate or economically feasible is not yet established. n38 In
its motion for
summary judgment, the State seeks to exclude from the population of allocable
fish the
"first generation"
[**29] of hatchery-produced
fish. Subsequent generations, who spend their entire life cycle in the natural
environment, are undisputedly included in the
tribes'
treaty share. n39
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n36. Plaintiffs' fact statements 191, 194, and
corresponding admissions.
n37. Defendants' fact statement 8 (and subparts), and
corresponding admissions.
n38. Id., especially defendants' fact statements 8.2, 8.3, and 8.5, and
corresponding admissions, denials, and explanatory comments.
n39. Defendants' brief of March 7, 1980, re
hatchery
fish
summary judgment at 3.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
C
The Court concludes that all
hatchery
fish must be included in the computation of the
tribes'
treaty share in order to effectuate the parties' intent and the purposes of the
fishing clause. The Supreme Court's recent reaffirmation of the long-standing view
that the
treaties were designed to guarantee the
tribes an adequate supply of
fish goes far toward resolving the
hatchery issue.
"Governor Stevens and his associates were well aware of the
"sense' in
[**30] which the
Indians were likely to view assurances of their
fishing rights. During the negotiations, the vital importance of the
fish to the
Indians was repeatedly emphasized by both sides, and the Governor's promises that the
treaties would protect the source of food and commerce were crucial in obtaining the
Indians' assent. It is absolutely clear, as Governor Stevens himself said, that
neither he nor the
Indians intended that the latter
"should be excluded from their
ancient
fisheries,' and it is accordingly inconceivable that either party deliberately agreed to
authorize future settlers to crowd the
Indians
[*198] out of any meaningful use of their
accustomed places to
fish."
Washington Phase I, supra, 443 U.S. at 676, 99 S. Ct. at 3070 (citations omitted).
The only express limitation on the
tribes' right of taking
fish is the requirement to share the harvest
"in common with" non-Indians. The only implicit limitations on that right are the
tribes'
moderate living needs, the State's power to impose conservation measures necessary to
preserve the resource, and the physical availability of
fish.
Id. at 686-689, 99 S. Ct. at 3075-3076;
Final Decision I, supra, 384 F.
[**31] Supp. at 401-402. No court has implied any additional limitations based on the species or origin
of the
fish, or the purpose, manner, or timing of the taking. Id.
It is now beyond dispute that natural
fish have become relatively scarce, due at least in part to the commercialization
of the
fishing industry and the degradation of the
fishing
habitat caused primarily by non-Indian activity in the case area. n40 The record also establishes that the State has
developed and promoted its artificial propagation program in order to replace
the
fish that were artificially lost. In 1977, the State described its
hatchery program as follows:
"Salmon
hatcheries * * * are a means of combating losses of
fish life caused by
environmental changes. They are an aid to crippled
streams in producing
fish, occasionally a substitute for them. Because of competitive
water, land, and forest exploitation, it has been necessary to develop controlled
methods of sustaining or rehabilitating the stocks of
fish which inhabit fresh
water
streams." n41
The mitigation purpose of the State's
hatchery program has been echoed throughout its history. This statement by a
Fisheries spokesman in 1946
typifies
[**32] the statements and publications frequently issued by the State:
"The present purpose of the
salmon
hatchery is not to replace nature, nor to eliminate it, but to supplement the work of
nature in places where the works of man have caused an unnatural situation
which reduces the effectiveness of natural propagation.
Hatcheries are intended to replace the production of
streams destroyed by dams, diversions, pollution, or obstructions, and to build up the
runs and
streams that are not producing to full capacity." n42
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n40.
Washington Phase I, supra n.2, 443 U.S. at 668-669, 99 S. Ct. at 3065-3066;
Post-Trial Decisions, supra n.2, 459 F. Supp. at 1079-1080 (hatchery injunction);
Final Decision I, supra n.2, 384 F. Supp. at 334, 353 (P 13.3). See also section V.A., infra.
41. Affidavit of Howard
Droker at 8, quoting State publication entitled
"Salmon
Hatcheries."
42. Droker affidavit at 5, quoting speech by Jack Hurley. See generally Droker
affidavit.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
See also
Post-Trial Decisions, supra, 459
[**33] F. Supp. at 1074, 1081 (hatcheries injunction). It is equally evident that
hatchery
fish represent an ever-increasing proportion of the total
fish population in the case area. Whereas
hatchery-bred
steelhead trout accounted for 10 percent of all
steelhead trout in 1950, their representation rose to 20 percent in 1960, 40 percent in 1970,
and 60 percent in 1980. n43 According to the chief of the Game Department's
Fisheries Management Division:
"Hatchery-reared winter-run
steelhead make up a high percentage of the
catch of
steelhead in the state with some of the heavily planted rivers
showing
hatchery returns contributing up to 90% of the
catch * * *. Overall it appears likely that
hatchery
steelhead will continue to contribute significantly to the harvests, while the numbers
of wild
fish will most likely decline." n44
The inescapable conclusion is that if
hatchery
fish were to be excluded from the allocation, the
Indians' treaty-secured right to an adequate supply of
fish n45 the right for
[*199] which they traded millions of acres of valuable land and resources would be
placed in jeopardy. The
tribes' share would steadily dwindle and the paramount purpose of the
treaties
[**34] would be subverted. Contrary to what the Supreme Court held to be the
parties' intentions, nontreaty
fishermen would ultimately
"crowd the
Indians out of any meaningful use of their
accustomed places to
fish."
Washington Phase I, supra, 443 U.S. at 676-677, 99 S. Ct. at 3070.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n43. State's proposed stipulation,
§ I (plaintiffs contend that accurate data from which to compute
accurate percentages is not available. Plaintiffs' response at 9).
n44. Affidavit of Jack Ayerst, attachment 1, at 3, 19 (emphasis added).
n45.
"Indian
treaty rights * * * secures (sic) so much as * * * is necessary to provide the
Indians with a livelihood that is to say, a
moderate living."
Washington Phase I, supra n.2, 443 U.S. at 686, 99 S. Ct. at 3075.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
D
None of the arguments advanced by the State calls for the exclusion of
hatchery
fish from the
treaty allocation. First, the State focuses on the intentions of the negotiators.
Proceeding on the accurate assumption that neither the
Indians nor the federal officials
[**35] conceived of artificial propagation facilities when the
treaties were drafted in 1854 and 1855, n46 the State argues that the
Indians' concepts of property rights were such that, if they had divined the advent of
hatcheries, they would not have presumed to be entitled to State-funded
hatchery
fish. In
short, the State contends that the
tribes subscribed to the doctrine that one may claim the fruits of his own labor.
The record establishes that the
Indians recognized exclusive property interests in land and in sedentary resources.
n47 However, the
Indians viewed migratory
fish and animals differently from stationary ones. The right to take
fish existed when, and only when, the
fish were within or passing through a
tribe's particular territory. n48
Indians attempted to
"enhance" their
fish supply by religious means, n49 but there is no evidence that those who
participated in enhancement activities attained any superior or exclusive
interests in the
fish for whose arrival they had prayed. n50
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n46. Plaintiffs claim that the easterners who negotiated the
treaties on behalf of the United States would have known about the decline of the
Atlantic
salmon
fishery and the introduction of
hatcheries in the East. However, the only support for this contention are some
highly-speculative comments of
anthropologist Barbara Lane, who in turn relied primarily on one book written
by a Canadian in 1856. See Lane affidavit at 3-4. This material is
insufficient to raise a genuine dispute of fact or to require reconsideration
of the Supreme Court's finding that
"(because) of the great abundance of
fish and the limited population of the area, it simply was not contemplated that
either party would interfere with the other's
fishing rights."
Washington Phase I, supra n.2, 443 U.S. at 668, 99 S. Ct. at 3065. Cf. affidavit of Anthony Netboy at 5-6.
[**36]
n47. Plaintiffs' fact statements 111-117, 120-121, 137-138, defendants' fact
statements 10.1-10.5, 11.3, and
corresponding admissions.
n48. Lane affidavit at 7-10. In contrast to Dr. Lane's conjectural remarks
regarding the eastern negotiators' knowledge of
hatchery
facilities (e.g., they
"likely knew" (at 4),
"it is reasonable to assume" (at 7)), her statements regarding the
Indians' customs are more solidly based, more squarely within her expertise, and more
closely akin to her reports and testimony which Judge Boldt praised and on
which he expressly relied in
Phase I. See
Final Decision I, supra n.2, 384 F. Supp. at 350 and passim. Although the State purports to deny plaintiffs' fact statements
118-119 regarding the
Indians' property concepts applicable to migratory
fish, the State provides no supporting facts sufficient to contradict the Lane
affidavit or to raise a genuine dispute as to this fact.
n49. Plaintiffs' fact statements 122, 124, and
corresponding admissions.
n50. Defendants' bare denial of plaintiffs' fact statement 130 is insufficient
to create a genuine dispute in light of plaintiffs' supporting material in the
Lane affidavit at 8-9.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
[**37]
The State attempts to bolster its interpretation of the parties' intent by
referring to the shellfish proviso that was tacked onto the
fishing clause:
"The right of taking
fish * * * is further secured to said
Indians, * * * Provided, however, That they shall not take shell
fish from any beds staked or cultivated by citizens."
The State argues that the shellfish proviso illustrates the parties' intent to
deny the
Indians access to resources created or enhanced by non-Indian efforts. Again the State misperceives the
tribes' notions of property law. As described above,
Indians considered shellfish, as sedentary creatures, to be the exclusive province of
the
tribe
[*200] within whose territory they were located. Thus, the proviso imposed no
limitation on the
Indians' then-existing activities because only resident
tribe members were entitled to take local shellfish. Rather, the function of the
proviso was to enable non-Indian settlers to establish their own, exclusive ownership of shellfish
beds and storage areas that might have otherwise belonged to the
tribes. n51 The shellfish proviso carved an exception into the
Indians' rule that a
tribe had exclusive use of
[**38] sedentary resources within its territory. It did not reflect the adoption of
the conceptually-distinct rule, urged here by the State but not recognized in
1854-1855 by the
Indians, that one who cultivates a resource thereby gains an exclusive ownership
interest in it.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n51. Lane affidavit at 9.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Next, the State focuses on the fact that the
tribes'
fishing right is a
reserved, rather than a granted, right. That is, the
treaties authorized the
Indians to continue to exercise their preexisting right to take
fish; they did not create new or additional
fishing rights for the
tribes. This characterization of
treaty rights has long been established beyond cavil. See, e.g.,
United States v. Winans, supra, 198 U.S. at 381, 25 S. Ct. at 664, quoted approvingly in
Washington Phase I, supra, 443 U.S. at 680, 99 S. Ct. at 3071. The State invokes it here to claim that because
hatcheries were neither in existence nor in the parties' contemplation when the
treaties were signed, the
Indians could not have
reserved the right
[**39] to take
hatchery
fish. This claim contravenes considerable case law and is directly refuted by
Winans, the leading case on which the state relies regarding the nature of
reserved rights.
In
Winans, private parties constructed a state-licensed
fish wheel on the Columbia River and thereby foreclosed the Yakima
Indians from
fishing at some of their usual and
accustomed places. The Supreme Court held that it violated the
fishing clause of the
Treaty with the Yakimas (one of the
treaties in issue here) for the non-Indians to use
"modern" devices which have the effect of preempting the
tribes'
fishing right.
"New conditions came into
existence, to which those (fishing) rights had to be accommodated. Only a limitation of them, however, was
necessary and intended, not a taking away. * * *
* * * In the actual taking of
fish white men may not be confined to a spear or crude net, but it does not follow
that they may construct and use a device which gives them exclusive possession
of the
fishing places."
Winans, supra, 198 U.S. at 381-382, 25 S. Ct. at 664.
In
Phase I of this case, the Supreme Court stated that
"even more significant than the language in
Winans is its actual
[**40] disposition. * * * It assured the
Indians a share of the
fish."
Washington Phase I, supra, 443 U.S. at 681, 99 S. Ct. at 3072. Clearly, the
treaties
reserved to the
tribes more than a share of the 1854 and 1855
salmon runs; they also
reserved the right to share in all future runs. In light of the fact that
hatchery-bred
fish constitute an ever-increasing proportion of the relatively-stable total
catch,
hatchery
fish must be included in the
tribes' allocation in order to
"assure the
Indians a share of the
fish."
Finally, the State contends that it has regulatory and ownership interests in
hatchery
fish and that neither the
treaties nor any subsequent enactment has preempted such interests. With respect to
the State's asserted regulatory interest, it has been firmly established that
the State's authority to regulate
treaty
fishing extends no further than the imposition of nondiscriminatory, necessary
conservation measures. See Puyallup trilogy, supra;
Final Decision I, supra, 384 F. Supp. at 333, 339, 342, 345-347, 401-403. The State has not claimed that it seeks to regulate the allocation of
hatchery
fish in order to conserve the resource. Rather, the State believes that because
[**41] it provides funding for (at least part of) its
hatchery program, its authority to
regulate
hatchery
fish is not limited to conservation measures. The crux of the State's argument is
that it has bought its way out of the obligation to respect the
[*201]
tribes'
treaty rights. n52 Both the premise and the conclusion of this argument are
fallacious. First, the State's use of the term
"regulate" is inappropriate. The State does not seek to control the time, manner,
location, or extent of hatchery-fish
fishing; it wishes to control the allocation of
hatchery
fish. n53 Second, it is too late in the day to challenge the fact, recently
reaffirmed in
Phase I, that the
treaty governs the allocation of
fish. Under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, the State is bound by the
allocation decreed pursuant to the
treaty. In the absence of a claim that
hatchery
fish must be excluded from the allocation in order to preserve the resource, the
State's police powers are not implicated in the determination whether
hatchery
fish are
"fish" for purposes of the
treaty allocation.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n52. See defendants' brief of March 7, 1980, re
hatchery
fish
summary judgment at 11-14; defendants' legal contentions III (and subparts).
[**42]
n53. Instead of the 50/50 basis for allocating
treaty
fish between
tribal and nontribal
fishermen, the State would allocate
hatchery
fish on an equal opportunity basis. The Supreme Court has consistently rejected
the equal opportunity approach to allocation under the
treaties.
Washington Phase I, supra n.2, 443 U.S. at 679-685, 99 S. Ct. at 3071-3074, and cases cited therein.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Ultimately, the State is asserting an ownership interest in
hatchery
fish. This argument must fail as a matter of law. As the State concedes, the
Supreme Court has flatly rejected the notion that a state owns
fish swimming within its
waters.
"
"To put the claim of the State
upon title is,' in Mr. Justice Holmes' words,
"to lean upon a slender reed.' A State does not stand in the same position as
the owner of a private game preserve and it is pure fantasy to talk of
"owning' wild
fish, birds, or animals. Neither the State nor the Federal Government, any more
than a hopeful fisherman or hunter, has title to these creatures until they are
reduced to possession by skillful capture."
Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc.,
[**43] 431 U.S. 265, 284, 97 S. Ct. 1740, 1751, 52 L. Ed. 2d 304 (1977) (citations omitted).
See also
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 99 S. Ct. 1727, 60 L. Ed. 2d 250 (1979). The State invites this Court to limit Douglas and Hughes to natural
fish and to reinstate with respect to
hatchery
fish the
nineteenth-century rule that a state owns its public resources. Whatever merit
the State's argument might have when applied to
fish confined within
hatchery facilities, it has no logical application to
harvestable
fish that have been released from such facilities and are freely swimming alongside
naturally-bred
fish in the State's rivers,
streams, and bays. The State acknowledges that private
hatchery owners have no ownership interest in
fish released into public
waters. n54 Both Douglas and Hughes counsel against the recognition of any ownership
interests in the State with respect to
hatchery
fish that have been released from the State's possession.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n54. Defendants' brief of March 7, 1980, re
hatchery
fish
summary judgment at 13.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
[**44]
The State attempts to overcome the import of Douglas and Hughes by relying on
two recent takings cases. Its reliance is misplaced. In
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 100 S. Ct. 383, 62 L. Ed. 2d 332 (1979), and
Vaughn v. Vermilion Corp., 444 U.S. 206, 100 S. Ct. 399, 62 L. Ed. 2d 365 (1979), the Supreme Court held that when a private party builds channels on private
property with private funds, the fact that such channels ultimately join with
navigable waterways does not render the private channels subject to public
access as if public waterways. These cases do not suggest that the investment
of state funds in
hatchery facilities would give rise to state ownership of
hatchery-bred, but since-released,
fish. First, the Court distinguished between privately-constructed projects that
replace preexisting navigable waterways and those that do not involve the
destruction and replacement of public waterways. Whereas a private ownership
interest
exists in the latter situation, the Court suggested that it might well not
exist in the former situation.
Vaughn, supra, 100 S. Ct. at 401. This case is more closely
[*202] analogous to the former situation, if it is in any
[**45] way analogous to the waterways cases, because
hatchery
fish are produced in order to replace depleted natural stocks. Second, both Kaiser
and Vaughn involved the relationship between private parties and the federal
government for purposes of the Takings Clause. This case involves the
relationship between a state and
Indian
tribes and no takings issue is present. Third, there is a significant difference
between requiring a private property owner to grant the public access to his
property after his improvements have been connected to public property, which
the Supreme Court held in Kaiser and Vaughn could not be done without providing
just compensation, and entitling a state to
claim ownership of
hatchery
fish once they are released from a
hatchery facility and swimming freely in public
waters.
The legal conclusion that the State lacks an ownership interest in released
hatchery
fish is reinforced by the factual circumstances of this case. Although the State
provides considerable funding for its
hatchery program, it is undisputed that federal and local governments as well as
private parties also contribute to the construction and operation of State-run
hatcheries. n55 In addition,
[**46] the State's
hatcheries supply only a portion of the
hatchery
fish population; federal,
tribal, private, and cooperative (State-private, State-tribal)
hatcheries account for approximately 25 percent of the
hatchery-bred
steelhead and 22 percent of the
hatchery-bred
salmon in the case area. n56 It would be inequitable and contrary to the spirit and
intent of the
treaties were the State-produced
hatchery
fish to be exempt from the
treaties'
"in
common with" sharing requirement while
hatchery
fish supported by
tribal and federal funds would be divided equally between the
tribes and all other State citizens.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n55. See supra n.31.
n56. State's proposed stipulation,
§ II (as amended by letter of August 15, 1980), and plaintiffs' response, Table
II-1.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Moreover, the inclusion of
hatchery
fish in the allocation need not affect nontreaty
fishermen adversely. The Supreme Court plainly stated that the measure of the
tribes'
treaty share is that quantity of
fish sufficient to provide them with a
moderate standard
[**47] of living, subject to a maximum share of 50 percent of the total
catch.
Washington Phase I, supra, 443 U.S. at 686-687, 99 S. Ct. at 3075. For every
hatchery
fish taken to satisfy the
tribes'
moderate living
needs, an additional natural
fish is available to the nontreaty
fishermen. Under the
moderate needs test, inclusion of
hatchery
fish would alter the composition but not the size of the
tribes' allocation. In conclusion, the Court holds that
hatchery
fish are
"fish" within the meaning of the
treaties'
fishing clause and consequently are subject to allocation thereunder.
IV
A
From the numerous opinions rendered in
Phase I, and the application of the principles enunciated therein to the
hatchery issue, flows the resolution of the remaining issue in
Phase II the
environmental issue. As previously noted, the only aspect of this issue presently before
the Court is the legal question whether the
tribes'
fishing right includes the right to have
treaty
fish protected from
environmental degradation. Plaintiffs' pending motion for
partial
summary judgment does not reach the additional questions whether the State is violating the
tribes' alleged
environmental right and what relief
[**48] may be warranted. n57 This
motion was briefed and argued prior to the issuance of the Supreme Court's
Phase I decision, which essentially rejected the principal assumptions underlying
the State's arguments here.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n57. Plaintiffs have suggested that the declaratory judgment sought in
connection with this motion may, as a practical matter, dispose of the entire
environmental issue regardless of in whose favor that judgment is entered. Plaintiffs seek
only prospective relief and, in light of the State's pledge to abide by the
ruling in this case, implementation of a declaratory judgment may well resolve
the underlying dispute without the necessity of further court proceedings.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
[*203] At the outset, the Court holds that implicitly incorporated in the
treaties'
fishing clause is the right to have the
fishery
habitat protected from man-made despoliation. Virtually every case construing this
fishing clause has recognized it to be the cornerstone of the
treaties and has emphasized its overriding importance
[**49] to the
tribes. See
Washington Phase I, supra, 443 U.S. at 664-667, 675-681, 99 S. Ct. at 3063-3065, 3069-3072, and cases cited therein. The
Indians understood, and were led by Governor Stevens to believe, that the
treaties entitled them to continue
fishing in perpetuity and that the settlers would not qualify, restrict, or interfere
with their right to take
fish.
Final Decision I, supra, 384 F. Supp. at 334, 355-357.
The most fundamental prerequisite to exercising the right to take
fish is the existence of
fish to be taken. In order for
salmon and
steelhead trout to survive, specific
environmental conditions must be present. A
fisheries study prepared jointly by the State and the federal government identifies at
least five such conditions:
"(1) access to and from the sea, (2) an adequate supply of good-quality
water, (3) a sufficient amount of suitable gravel
for
spawning and egg incubation, (4) an ample supply of food, and (5) sufficient shelter." n58 It is undisputed that
"alteration of even one of these essential, finely-balanced requirements will
affect the production potential." n59 It is also undisputed that these conditions have been altered and that
human activities have
[**50] seriously degraded the quality of the
fishery
habitat.
"Over the years, there has been a gradual deterioration and loss of natural
fish production
habitat in Washington State
streams. Although there are many individual factors contributing to this, the general
trend toward reduced production
habitat is more the result of a combination of activities performed by man activities
which alter and destroy one or more
habitat conditions required for successful
fish production. Generally, these factors can be categorized under the broad
headings of watershed alterations,
water storage dams, industrial developments,
stream channel alterations, and residential developments.
A
century ago,
salmon abounded in the Pacific Northwest. Almost every accessible area, even in the
deep interior, nurtured crops of
salmon which renewed themselves as they had for millennia. However, in the Twentieth
Century the urbanization and intensive settlement of the area, the rapid
development of
water power, lumbering and irrigation and the pollution of the watersheds reduced
the quality and amount of accessible
spawning grounds. These activities also reduced the rearing capacity of the
streams." n60
[**51]
Were this trend to continue, the right to take
fish would eventually be reduced to the right to dip one's net into the
water... and bring it out empty. Such result would render nugatory the nine-year
effort in
Phase I, sanctioned by this Court, the Ninth Circuit, and the Supreme Court, to
enforce the
treaties'
reservation to the
tribes of a sufficient quantity of
fish to meet their fair needs. The Supreme Court all but resolved the
environmental issue when it expressly rejected the State's
contention, initially reiterated on this motion, that the
treaty right is but an equal opportunity to try to
catch
fish. Rather, the Court held that the
treaty assures the
tribes something considerably more tangible than
"merely the chance * * * occasionally to dip their nets into the territorial
waters."
Washington
[*204] Phase I, supra, 443 U.S. at 679, 99 S. Ct. at 3071. n61
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n58. United States
Fish and Wildlife Service, Washington Department of
Fisheries, and Washington Department of Game, Joint Statement Regarding the Biology,
Status, Management, and Harvest of the
Salmon and
Steelhead Resources of the Puget Sound and Olympic Peninsular Drainage Areas of Western
Washington (1973) ("Joint Biology Statement") at 17.
[**52]
n59. Id.
60. Id. at 20, 78.
n61. The Supreme Court's use of the term
"harvestable" in describing the population of allocable
fish did not, contrary to the State's contention, put the
tribes at the
mercy of any and all, natural and man-made, fluctuations in the resource. The
term simply differentiates between the total
fish population and those
fish subject to allocation under the
treaty. The remainder must escape for
spawning purposes in order to perpetuate the resource.
Washington Phase I, supra n.2, 443 U.S. at 670 n.15, 99 S. Ct. at 3067 n.15.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
The Supreme Court similarly disposed of the State's argument that when the
tribes signed the
treaties, they bargained for both the costs and the benefits of economic development.
The State suggests that the
tribes entered the
treaty negotiations with the understanding that the United States was encouraging non-Indian settlement of the West, that non-Indians would commercially develop the natural resources, and that the United States
intended to diversify the
Indian economy and acculturate the
Indians into the non-Indian way of life.
[**53] n62 To the contrary, it is well established that the
treaty negotiators specifically assured the
tribes that they could continue to
fish notwithstanding the changes that the impending western expansion would
certainly entail.
"These people (Governor Stevens and his advisers) recognized the vital
importance of the
fisheries to the
Indians and wanted to protect them from the risk that non-Indian settlers might seek to monopolize their
fisheries."
Washington Phase I, supra, 443 U.S. at 666, 99 S. Ct. at 3064.
It has been stated repeatedly that neither party to the
treaties, nor their successors in interest, may act in a manner that destroys the
fishery. See, e.g.,
United States v. State of Washington, supra, 520 F.2d at 685;
Final Decision I, supra, 384 F. Supp. at 401-402;
Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation v. Alexander, 440 F. Supp. 553 (D.Or.1977) ("Umatilla"). In Umatilla, a
fishing clause substantially identical to those
in question here was held to bar the construction of a dam which would have
flooded some
Indian
fishing stations, prevented all wild
fish from swimming upstream, and completely eliminated the
steelhead run above the dam. Nothing
[**54] short of an express congressional directive could impair the
tribes'
fishing right.
Id. at 555. Conversely, the Supreme Court ruled in Puyallup III that the State's
conservation-oriented
regulation must be applied to on as well as off-reservation
fishing because otherwise the
tribes might frustrate other citizens' exercise of their
fishing right.
Puyallup III, supra, 433 U.S. at 176-177, 97 S. Ct. at 2623. The only significant difference between the holding here and prior decisions
is that the general rule that neither party may impair the other's
fishing right is applied to the particular situation of impairment by
environmental degradation rather than by physical device, n63 by otherwise-burdened access to the
fishery, n64 by discriminatory
regulation, n65 or by discriminatory application of neutral
regulations. n66
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n62. Defendants' brief on motion for
partial
summary judgment (Mar. 31, 1979) at 23-48.
n63.
United States v. Winans, supra n.3 (re
fish wheel).
n64.
Tulee v. Washington, supra n.3 (re
fishing license fee).
n65. Puyallup II, supra n.3 (re ban on all-Indian net
fishing in favor of all-non-Indian hook-and-line
fishing).
[**55]
n66.
Final Decision I, supra n.2, 384 F. Supp. at 388-399, 403-404 (re discriminatory enforcement of Washington's
fishing
regulations).
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
The conclusion that the treaty-secured
fishing right incorporates an
environmental right is consonant with the implied-reservation-of-water doctrine that is often employed in the construction of
Indian
treaties. In
Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 28 S. Ct. 207, 52 L. Ed. 340 (1908), the seminal case in this area, the Supreme Court held that when the
treaty creating the Fort Belknap
Indian
Reservation was signed, the parties impliedly
reserved a sufficient quantity of
water to irrigate the arid
reservation land. Without that
water, the purpose of creating the
Reservation to enable the
tribe to give up its nomadic existence
[*205] and sustain itself on a relatively small tract of land would be incapable of
fulfillment.
Id. at 576, 28 S. Ct. at 211. Thus, the construction of dams or reservoirs or the undertaking of any other
activities that would prevent
water from flowing to the
Reservation was enjoined. See also
United States v. New Mexico, 438
[**56] U.S. 696, 98 S. Ct. 3012, 57 L. Ed. 2d 1052 (1978);
Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 96 S. Ct. 2062, 48 L. Ed. 2d 523 (1976);
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 83 S. Ct. 1468, 10 L. Ed. 2d 542 (1963). For present purposes, there are two notable limitations on the
implied-reservation-of-water doctrine. First,
water rights may be implied only
"(w)here
water is necessary to
fulfill the very purposes for which a federal
reservation was created," and not where it is merely
"valuable for a secondary use of the
reservation."
New Mexico, supra, 438 U.S. at 702, 98 S. Ct. at 3015. However, so long as
water rights are necessary to exercise expressly-reserved rights, they arise by
implication regardless of the equities that may favor competing
water users.
Cappaert, supra, 426 U.S. at 138-139, 96 S. Ct. at 2069. Second, the scope of the implied right is circumscribed by the necessity that
calls for its creation. The doctrine
"reserves only that amount of
water necessary to
fulfill the purpose of the
reservation, no more."
Id. at 141, 96 S. Ct. at 2070.
In this case, there can be no doubt that one of the paramount purposes of the
treaties in question was to reserve to the
tribes
[**57] the right to continue
fishing as an economic and cultural way of life. It is equally beyond doubt that the
existence of an environmentally-acceptable
habitat is essential to the survival of the
fish, without which the expressly-reserved right to take
fish would be meaningless and valueless. Thus, it is necessary to recognize an
implied
environmental right in order to
fulfill the purposes of the
fishing clause. Indeed, courts have already recognized implied
water rights for the specific purpose of preserving
fish.
In both
Cappaert, supra, and United States v. Anderson, No. 3643 (E.D.Wash., July 23, 1979), the
unimpaired flow of sufficient quantities of
water was held to be necessary for the protection of
fish located in a national monument and an
Indian
reservation. Here, plaintiffs claim that the
treaties impliedly
reserved
water of sufficient quality to sustain the
salmon and
steelhead trout which they have the expressly-reserved right to take. The recognition of that
implied right is no less necessary here than in Cappaert or Anderson. In fact,
the
fishing clause is even more crucial to the purposes of the
treaties here in question than were the fish-related clauses in those
[**58] cases.
The State argues at some length that it is not necessary to imply an
environmental right because there currently exist numerous federal and State programs
designed to protect the
fish
habitat. There is no dispute regarding the existence, as opposed to the
effectiveness, of those programs. However, the fact that there may be
means of at least partially protecting the
fish
habitat does not negate the existence of the right. n67 An
environmental right must be implied in order to
fulfill the purposes of the
fishing clause. Whether existing means of enforcing that right are adequate (as the
State contends), or whether supplementary means must be adopted (as plaintiffs
request), is a
[*206] separate issue to be addressed at the remedial stage of this litigation.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n67.
Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 460 F. Supp. 1320 (E.D.Wash.1978), is not to the contrary. There, Judge Neill declined to find an implied
reservation of
water in order to protect Lahontan trout
spawning grounds on the Colville
Indian
Reservation. The record established that although power and reclamation dams eliminated
natural
spawning grounds, a federally-operated
hatchery made replacement trout available to the
tribe and the
tribes'
fishing right was not shown to be impaired. Therefore, it was not
necessary to imply an
environmental right in order to
fulfill the purposes for which the Colville
Reservation was created.
Id. at 1330. Here, the record establishes beyond dispute that
environmental degradation has impaired the
fish
habitat. Moreover, there is no showing that
hatchery programs have fully mitigated the resulting diminution in the
fishery. The recognition of an implied
environmental right is essential to the
tribes' exercise of their
fishing right; the extent of such right will later be determined in light of the
adequacy of existing
environmental protection and artificial propagation programs.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
[**59]
B
The State raises the jurisprudential defense that even if the
tribes'
fishing right encompasses the right to
environmental protection of the
fish, the correlative
duty associated with that right rests with the federal government and not with the
State. The State invokes Hohfeldian analysis for the proposition that the
nature of a
"right" is best understood in relation to its jural correlative
"duty." See Hohfeld, Some
Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied In Judicial Reasoning,
23 Yale L.J. 16, 30-34 (1913). The thrust of the late Professor Hohfeld's discussion is to refine the concept
of right by distinguishing legal relations based on right from those based on
privilege, power, and immunity. As enlightening as Hohfeldian analysis may be,
its application to this case is elusive at best. The scope of the implied
environmental right is governed by the scope of the express
fishing right whose purpose it is designed to
fulfill. There is no question that the
duty correlative to the
environmental right is similarly limited in scope. The issue raised here, which in no way
implicates Hohfeldian analysis, is whether the
duty correlative to the
tribes'
environmental right rests
[**60] exclusively with the United States or whether it equally binds the State.
Nowhere does Hohfeld suggest a direct correlation between the number of
entities possessing a right and the number of entities subject to the
duty not to
violate that right.
More to the point, the Supremacy Clause imposes upon the State the
duty not to violate federal rights, including those secured by federal
treaties. The fact that the federal government is under a comparable
duty, as a party to the
treaties, not to violate the
tribes'
environmental right does not relieve the State of its own obligations under the Supremacy
Clause. As Judge Boldt expressly held in
Phase I:
"Admission of the State of Washington into the Union upon an equal footing with
the original states had no effect upon the
treaty rights of the Plaintiff
tribes. Such admission imposed upon the State, equally with other states, the
obligation to observe and carry out the provisions of
treaties of the United States."
Final Decision I, supra, 384 F. Supp. at 401.
C
The more difficult issues pertaining to the State's
duty involve its nature and scope. Several guiding
considerations emerge from the numerous cases involving
[**61] disputes between states and
treaty
tribes. First, the treaty-secured right to take
fish at usual and
accustomed places may not be qualified or conditioned by the State.
Puyallup I, supra, 391 U.S. at 398-399, 88 S. Ct. at 1728. See also
Tulee v. Washington, supra;
Winans, supra;
Final Decision I, supra, 384 F. Supp. at 401. Second, the State may not subordinate the
fishing right to any other objectives or purposes it may prefer.
"It (the state) may not force
treaty
Indians to yield their own protected interests in order to promote the welfare of the
state's other citizens."
United States v. State of Washington, supra, 520 F.2d at 686.
See also
Final Decision I, supra, 384 F. Supp. at 401-402;
Sohappy v. Smith, 302 F. Supp. 899, 908 (D.Or.1969). Third, the State may affirmatively regulate
treaty
fishing solely for the purpose of conserving the resource. Puyallup trilogy, supra;
Final Decision I, supra, 384 F. Supp. at 333-334, 342, 401-404;
Sohappy v. Smith, supra, 302 F. Supp. at 908-912. It would virtually obliterate these narrowly-drawn limitations on the State's
authority were this Court to rule, by denying plaintiffs' pending motion, that
the State may now regulate
[**62]
treaty
fishing for two purposes: to conserve the resource or to destroy it.
Unlike many of the preceding cases, this case does not (at this stage of this
litigation) involve an attempt by the State affirmatively to regulate the
fishery. Contrary to the State's apprehensions, neither does this case involve an
attempt by plaintiffs
[*207] to impose an affirmative
duty on the State to
protect the
fish
habitat. Rather, plaintiffs seek the recognition of a negative
duty such that when the State exercises its broad regulatory powers it does not
impair the
environmental conditions necessary for the survival of the
treaty
fish. According to the United States:
"The
duty here is the
duty to refrain from taking or approving actions which have a significant adverse
impact on the
treaty right
fishery. Plaintiff is not seeking any new legislation or expenditure of resources by
the State. It is merely asking that the State, in carrying out its regulatory
authority over public or private actions with
environmental impact, not authorize actions that will significantly damage or destroy the
treaty guaranteed
fishery." n68
In light of this characterization of the
duty sought to
[**63] be imposed, the State's claim that recognition of an
environmental right will require it to make additional expenditures in violation of the
Tenth Amendment and National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 96 S. Ct. 2465, 49 L. Ed. 2d 245 (1976), is ill-founded. The State need not make any additional expenditures, the
treaty right from which the State's
duty arises is not based on the commerce clause, n69 and the question of the
appropriate scope of any relief to be granted is not yet in issue. Moreover,
the State already purports to act as if it has voluntarily assumed the very
duty which it here resists.
"The (Washington
Fisheries) Department's
habitat protection functions include evaluating potential effects of public or private
projects or activities that may affect
salmon production. Reports and recommendations concerning these activities are made
to the appropriate agencies. * * *
Departmental functions that relate directly to
habitat protection include setting restrictions for hydraulic permits, inspecting
hydraulic projects, developing recommendations regarding
water right applications, and establishing
fish use flows for
salmon
production
streams. * * *
In
[**64] concert with the Department of
Fisheries, the Department of Game inspects and issues joint permits for hydraulic
permits. * * * Activities affecting
stream beds are directed to be conducted at a time and in a manner that minimize
adverse effects on the
stream environment for
fish. The two departments review all plans for major projects affecting
stream
habitat and develop appropriate recommendations. All
water right applications are similarly reviewed for their possible impact on
fishery resources and commented upon where needed. Recently, annual logging plans of
several major timber owners have come under detailed review and comment by
personnel of both departments." n70
Whether the State effectively carries out these activities, and whether they
are adequate, are questions to be addressed at the relief stage of this
litigation. For present purposes it is sufficient to note that the State has
at least implicitly acknowledged that it has a
duty not to
impair or permit the impairment of the
fish
habitat.
68. Plaintiffs' response to defendants' brief on motion for
summary judgment at 12 (United States' reply brief). See also plaintiff
tribes' reply memorandum re: plaintiffs' motion for
summary judgment at 37 n.14.
[**65]
n69. The Supreme Court's holding in
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 96 S. Ct. 2465, 49 L. Ed. 2d 245 (1976), has been limited to federal attempts under the commerce clause to impose
affirmative monetary obligations on states. See
Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.54, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 2035 n.54, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978).
70. Joint Biology Statement at 75-76, 90.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
As the parties approach the relief stage, of critical concern will be the
precise scope of the State's
environmental
duty. Plaintiffs urge the Court to hold the State to a standard of
"no significant deterioration," which would preclude the State from appreciably reducing the
environmental quality of the
fish
habitat. The State responds by
[*208] arguing that the cases cited by plaintiffs do not support their position. n71
The Court finds a more fundamental flaw in plaintiffs' proposal. The
"no significant deterioration" standard was articulated by courts and expressly adopted by Congress in order
to effectuate the goals of various
environmental statutes.
[**66] See
Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C.1972), aff'd per curiam,
4 E.R.C. 1815 (D.C.Cir.1972), aff'd by an equally divided Court
sub nom., Fri v. Sierra Club, 412 U.S. 541, 93 S. Ct. 2770, 37 L. Ed. 2d 140 (1973),
42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-7491 (1980) (re Clear Air Act,
42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq.);
United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 846 n.44 (7th Cir. 1977),
33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2) (re Federal
Water Pollution Control Act,
33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq.);
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 91 S. Ct. 814, 28 L. Ed. 2d 136 (1971),
49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (re Department of Transportation Act,
33 U.S.C. § 1651 et
seq.);
43 U.S.C. § 1782(c) (re Federal Land Policy and Management Act,
43 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq.). The standard reflects Congress' legislative judgment, arrived at
after weighing competing
environmental and economic considerations. In each of the above-cited statutes, Congress
indicated that the nondegradation standard was necessary in order to realize
the statutory objectives. In contrast, here the Court rather than Congress is
called upon to impose a nondegradation standard. It is well established that
the scope of an impliedly-reserved
[**67] right may not be broader than the minimal need which gives rise to the implied
right.
Cappaert, supra, 426 U.S. at 141, 96 S. Ct. at 2070. Thus, the scope of the State's
environmental
duty must be ascertained by examining the treaty-secured
fishing right rather than by selecting a desirable standard that has been imposed by
Congress in a different context.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n71. Having denied the existence of any
environmental right or any
environmental
duty upon the State, the State does not propose an alternative definition of the
scope of plaintiffs' asserted right.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
The
treaties reserve to the
tribes a sufficient quantity of
fish to satisfy their
moderate living needs, subject to a ceiling of 50 percent of the
harvestable run.
Washington Phase I, supra, 443 U.S. at 686-687, 99 S. Ct. at 3075. That is the minimal need which gives rise to an implied right to
environmental protection of the
fish
habitat. Therefore, the correlative
duty imposed upon the State (as well as the United States and third parties) is to
refrain
[**68] from degrading the
fish
habitat to an extent that would deprive the
tribes of their
moderate living needs.
The
tribes'
treaty allocation is currently set at 50 percent of each
harvestable run. Id. That the ceiling has been applied creates the
presumption that the
tribes'
moderate living needs exceed 50 percent and are not being fully satisfied under the
treaties. As the burden is upon the State to demonstrate to the
Phase I court that the
tribes' needs may be satisfied by a lesser allocation, the State must also bear the
burden in
Phase II to demonstrate that any
environmental degradation of the
fish
habitat proximately caused by the State's actions (including the authorization of
third parties' activities) will not impair the
tribes' ability to satisfy their
moderate living needs. Naturally, the plaintiffs must shoulder the initial burden of
proving that the challenged action(s) will proximately cause the
fish
habitat to be degraded such that the rearing or production potential of the
fish will be impaired or the size or quality of the run will be diminished.
V
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the plaintiffs' motion for
summary judgment on the
hatchery issue is GRANTED,
[**69] that the defendant's cross-motion for
summary judgment on the
hatchery issue is DENIED, and that the plaintiffs' motion for
partial
summary judgment on the
environmental issue is GRANTED. Plaintiffs shall prepare and lodge with the Court by
October 15, 1980, an appropriate form of order approved by defendants in
accordance with the findings of fact and conclusions of law set out in this
opinion.
|
|